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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
The Scottish economy is poised to come out 
of recession. But there is still uncertainty 
whether the exit will have occurred in the 
fourth quarter of last year as it did in the UK 
economy, all be it weakly. The UK economy 
went into recession one quarter ahead of 
Scotland and it may be that Scotland will 
come out of recession one quarter later than 
the UK. The survey evidence for the final 
quarter  of 2009, which cast some doubt on 
the strength of the recovery, certainly leaves 
that possibility open. 
 
Over the course of the recession total GVA in 
the Scottish economy has fallen by -6.13% 
compared to a slightly smaller contraction of 
-5.73% in the UK. The relative performance 
of the service sector largely accounts for the 
bigger impact of the recession in Scotland. 
Service sector GVA in Scotland fell by  
-4.76% while the contraction in UK services 
amounts to -4.59%. Manufacturing sectors 
have suffered more in the recession both in 
Scotland and the UK. But Scottish 
manufacturing GVA fell by -11.28% during 
the recession, less than the fall of -14.22% in 
UK manufacturing. Construction output has 
fallen by -13.08% in Scotland if the start of 
the sector’s recession is dated as 2008q2, 
which compares with a fall of -14.07% in the 
UK if the start of the sector’s recession is 
dated as 2008q1 to the trough of 2009q1. 
However, there is a good case for arguing 
that the recession, or structural downturn, in 
Scottish construction began after 2006q3, 
which was not mirrored in the UK. The loss 
of output in Scottish construction over this 
longer period amounts to -15.47%. UK 
construction, in contrast, has displayed a 
classic 'V' shape with a sharp and deep 
downturn followed by rapid recovery of 2.5% 
between 2009q1 and 2009q3. 
 
One aspect of the present recession is that 
the labour market outcomes have been 
appreciably different from the impact on 
output.  While Scottish GVA has fallen by  
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-6.13% over the recession, the number of 
employee jobs has fallen by only -2.67%. To 
the extent that it is more easy to cut labour 
hours via short-time working than it once 
was, then employers may be less likely to 
make workers redundant in the short-run.  
Productivity per hour will not drop by as 
much as productivity per worker and coupled 
with lower labour payments competitiveness 
will suffer less.  But it is arguable that a 
flexible labour market also makes it easier to 
dispense with the services of workers. If the 
recession is expected to persist, or the 
recovery expected to be very sluggish, then 
job shedding could pick up and 
unemployment continue to rise. 
 
The UK economy has a large public sector 
financial deficit and rising net debt levels and 
interest payment. The increase is largely a 
consequence of government policy action to 
deal with the recession as households and 
firms sought to adjust to high levels of pre-
recession debt by increasing saving and 
lowering spending. There is a need for a 
sizable adjustment in the UK's fiscal position. 
It is reasonable to argue that the government 
needs to set out in its March Budget a more 
credible and more clearly specified 
programme of fiscal tightening over the next 
five years than it did in the 2009 Pre-Budget 
Report.  
 
Yet, there is much uncertainty about 
household and corporate spending and 
because of this we have for some time urged 
caution about the timing of a fiscal 
consolidation in the UK. The UK and 
Argentina are the only two G-20 countries to 
have withdrawn their fiscal stimulus in 2010. 
The overall fiscal stance in 2010-11 is shown 
by the 2009 Pre-Budget Report to be 
negative. In our view this is dangerous given 
that UK households have the most 
adjustments to make to their balance sheets 
than households in other countries because 
the level of household debt was pre-crisis so 
high here. If the growth of world trade does 
start to pick up appreciably and this is likely 
later this year the UK should benefit 
disproportionately. Then there will be a real 
prospect of what the Bank of England and 
the government desires: a switch to export 
and investment led growth. But until that time 
given relatively flat household and corporate 
spending, a fiscal tightening in 2010, the 
ending of further quantitative easing this 
month, and the likely continuing sluggishness 
of bank lending, increases the risk of a 
double-dip recession this year. 
 
Some commentators have suggested that 
the UK is much the same as Greece in terms 
of risk of default on its debts.  But despite 
some superficial similarities, such as the 
relative size of the budget deficit, the UK 
fiscal position is much stronger. 
Nevertheless, there is a lesson to be learnt 
from the Greek experience and it is this: 
allowing countries/regions within a larger 
monetary union to retain fiscal autonomy 
may threaten the monetary union. It runs the 
risk of a fiscal crisis because the financial 
markets will not discipline fiscal laxity in any 
one country/region sufficiently early enough. 
The discipline needs to come from the 
political centre and that means that complete 
fiscal autonomy is ruled out, although some 
degree of fiscal devolution is clearly feasible.  
 
We are forecasting that Scotland will return 
to positive growth in 2010. But the recovery 
over the year is weak whilst household 
spending strengthens overall it continues to 
fall. Exports to the rest of the world continue 
to recover and at a faster rate than predicted 
in November. This along with some recovery 
of investment, though still negative, helps 
raise the forecast to 0.6% growth compared 
to our prediction of 0.1% in November. 
Recovery is weaker in Scotland than in the 
UK for the reasons that were well rehearsed 
in the previous Commentary and we see no 
basis for altering that view. Scottish GVA 
growth is better than the UK on the High 
growth scenario only. Trend growth is 
realised on our Central scenario in 2012. 
Employee job losses are forecast to continue 
from 2009 into 2010, with a net  96,000 jobs 
lost in those two years and not fully matched 
by job gains of 63,000 in 2011 and 2012. ILO 
unemployment is expected to peak at 
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216,000 or 8.1% this year falling to just under 
186,000 or 7.3% in 2011 and further to 
144,000 or 6.3% in 2012. However, if the 
recent trend in Scottish unemployment 
continues, which we think less likely, the rate 
could rise on our low growth scenario to 
9.9%, or 264,000, this year. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
GDP data for the Scottish economy for the third quarter of 
2009 became available in late January. The Scottish 
economy continued in recession in the third quarter with 
output falling by -0.2% and -4.6% over the year, much the 
same as the UK. But the contraction in quarterly output is 
clearly getting less – see Figure 1. 
 
Scotland’s GDP has therefore contracted by -6.13% over 
the five quarters since the recession began in second 
quarter of 2008. This is a somewhat greater loss of net 
output than the drop in the UK as a whole, which amounts to 
-5.73% over the six quarters from the start of recession in 
the first quarter of 2008. The decline in GDP in Scotland 
continues to mirror the decline in the UK as Figure 1 shows 
but nonetheless, on the data so far, the recession in output 
continues to be slightly more severe here. In the 4th quarter 
2009, the UK economy came out of recession growing by 
0.1%. Scottish GDP figures for the fourth quarter are not 
available until April but the graph above does suggest that 
the economy is moving in the right direction. 
 
In the 3rd quarter 2009 output in the service sector – 
accounting for 74% of overall GVA –  fell by -0.3% in 
Scotland and by -0.2% in UK – see Figure 2. However, 
while the service sector performed less well in Scotland than 
in the UK in the third quarter, manufacturing (14% of GVA) 
did better. Manufacturing GVA rose by 0.8% in Scotland 
against a fall of -0.2% in manufacturing in the UK - see 
Figure 3. 
 
The construction industry in Scotland continued to contract 
with GVA falling by -1.6% in the third quarter compared to 
an increase of 1.9% in the industry in the UK – see Figure 4. 
 
Within services, the main sectoral drivers of contraction in 
the second quarter were hotels & catering (3% of overall 
GVA), real estate & business services (REBS) (18% of 
GVA) and financial services (8% of GVA). Activity in hotels 
& catering fell by -2.3%, compared to a contraction of -2.1% 
in the sector in the UK. This again confirms, perhaps, that 
tourism to Scotland has not benefited by much from the 
decline in value of the pound sterling and by the 
“Homecoming Scotland” events. REBS output fell by -1.5% 
in Scotland compared to a fall of -0.4% in the UK. This 
contrasts with the previous quarter where REBS output rose 
by 0.9% after falling for four successive quarters. Clearly, 
the notion that the recession had ended in this key sector 
was illusory. Financial services contracted by -1.3% in 
Scotland compared to a greater fall of -2.0% in the sector in 
the UK – see Figure 5. On this evidence the recession in 
financial services appears to be easing somewhat in 
Scotland but not so in the UK, although the sector went into 
recession much later in the UK.  
 
Two service sectors experienced positive growth in the third 
quarter: retail & wholesale (11% of GVA), and transport & 
communication (7% of GVA). GVA in transport & 
communication services rose by 0.5% in Scotland, a little 
worse than the 0.7% increase experienced in the UK. Retail 
& wholesale GVA expanded by 1.5%, a little more than the 
1.4%% expansion in the sector in the UK. 
 
The stronger overall performance of Scottish manufacturing 
(0.8%) compared to UK manufacturing (-0.2%) in the third 
quarter was largely down to comparative strength in 4 
sectors: food, drink, metals, paper, printing & publishing. 
Food (1.4% of GVA) grew by 2%, compared to a fall of -
0.7% in the UK. The drinks industry (1.6% of GVA) grew by 
5% compared to growth of 1.5% in the UK where the sector 
is relatively smaller (0.4% of GVA). The metals sector (1% 
of GVA) grew more strongly in Scotland in the quarter, by 
1.6% compared to 0.3% in the UK. This stands in marked 
contrast to its performance in the second quarter when 
output fell by -8.8% in Scotland compared to a fall of -2.9% 
in the UK. Finally, paper, printing & publishing (1.4% of 
GVA) contributed to the overall stronger performance  of 
Scottish manufacturing by growing by 1.6% in the quarter 
while its UK counterpart contracted by -3.6%. Other 
manufacturing (1.7% of GVA) contributed positively to 
overall Scottish manufacturing performance through growth 
of 2.6% but the sector in the UK also grew strongly, by 
2.3%. Refined petroleum products also grew more strongly 
in Scotland, 5.7%, than the sector in the UK, 1.1%. But the 
contribution to better manufacturing performance in 
Scotland was small given its low share of GVA (0.2% of 
GVA). 
 
The chemicals industry continued to display negative growth 
in Scotland but with a drop in output of -0.3% compared to a 
fall of -0.8% in the UK, the significant contraction in output 
experienced in the 3 previous quarters appears to have 
halted. Finally, the engineering industry in Scotland (4.9% of 
GVA) appeared to slip back in the third quarter, with output 
falling by -2.1% compared to a fall of -0.1% in the sector in 
the UK. Within engineering,  all three principal sectors 
experienced negative growth. Electronics (2.9% of GVA) cut 
back production by -3.3% while the sector in the UK 
contracted by only -0.5%. So any hope that the positive 
growth registered by the sector in the second quarter 
heralded the end of recession has been dashed. Mechanical 
engineering reduced its output by -1.4% in the quarter a 
better performance than the contraction of -2.9% 
experienced in the sector in the UK. Finally, transport 
equipment (1% of GVA) saw a further small fall in 
production of -0.1% in Scotland compared to growth of 2.4% 
in the UK.  
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2009q3 
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Figure 2:  Scottish and UK Services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q3  
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basis prices 1998q2 to 2009q3 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK construction GVA volume growth 1998q2-2009q3 
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Output and employment in the recession 
Figure 6 charts the performance of key Scottish sectors over 
the past 12 years. The chart indicates that almost all of 
these key growth sectors have been affected by the 
recession  with the exception of the public sector. Some 
appear now to be recovering: transport & communication; 
retail & wholesale; other services; and food & drink. But 
there are likely to be set backs just as there was in 
electronics and REBs in the third quarter. 
 
Figure 7 indicates that over the course of the recession total 
GVA in the Scottish economy has fallen by -6.13% 
compared to a slightly smaller contraction of -5.73% in the 
UK. The figure makes clear that it is the relative 
performance of the service sector that largely accounts for 
the bigger impact of the recession in Scotland. Complicating 
this picture is the fact that some sectors began to recover 
sooner in the UK such as construction and in Scotland, such 
as manufacturing and other services. 
 
Service sector GVA in Scotland fell by -4.76% while the 
contraction in UK services amounts to -4.59%. Within 
services, the sectors that performed worst over the 
recession relative to their UK counterparts were: financial 
services (-18.16% in Scotland compared to -6.42% in the 
UK); REBS (-11.60% in Scotland, -6.34% in the UK); and 
hotels & catering (-11.26% in Scotland, -8.81% in the UK). 
In contrast, 3 service sectors did better over the recession 
than their counterparts in the UK: retail & wholesale (-3.80% 
in Scotland, -6.45% in the UK); transport & communication 
(-3.72% in Scotland, -6.93% in the UK); and other services 
(-6.64% in Scotland, -10.06% in the UK).  
 
Construction output has fallen by -13.08% in Scotland if the 
start of the sector’s recession is dated as 2008q2, which 
compares with a fall of -14.07% in the UK if the start of the 
sector’s recession is dated as 2008q1 to the trough of 
2009q1. However, there is a good case for arguing that the 
recession, or structural downturn, in Scottish construction 
began after 2006q3, which was not mirrored in the UK. The 
loss of output in Scottish construction over this longer period 
amounts to -15.47%. UK construction, in contrast, has 
displayed a classic 'V' shape with a sharp and deep 
downturn followed by rapid recovery of 2.5% between 
2009q1 and 2009q3. 
 
Manufacturing sectors have suffered more in the recession 
both in Scotland and the UK. Scottish manufacturing GVA 
fell  by -11.28% during the recession, less than the fall of 
 -14.22% in UK manufacturing. Within manufacturing, 
electronics lost -15.33% of its Scottish GVA but -17.12% of 
its UK GVA in the recession. The chemicals industry in 
Scotland was the biggest affected with GVA dropping by 
 -25.48% in just four quarters compared to the UK where 
GVA fell by -6.49% in six quarters. 
 
As we noted in the previous Commentary these data 
highlight some of the key dimensions of the present 
recession: its roots in the bursting of a commercial property 
and housing bubble and the indirect world-wide 
consequences for trade significantly depressing 
manufacturing output due to the much greater importance of 
export activity in the sector. 
 
One aspect of the present recession is that the labour 
market outcomes have been appreciably different from the 
impact on output.  This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
What Figure 8 shows is that while Scottish GVA has fallen 
by -6.13% over the recession, the number of employee jobs 
has fallen by only -2.67%. In these circumstances you would 
expect the average productivity of workers to fall. There is 
evidence that this has happened in the UK and that the drop 
in worker productivity parallels the fall in previous UK 
recessions (See Myers 2009, cited in Labour Market 
Review section below.) As that section notes, the 
apparently smaller impact of the recession on jobs than on 
output has been linked to the 'flexible' labour market. There 
is clear evidence that many employers have introduced 
more flexible working, reducing overtime and, to a lesser 
extent, implementing short-time working.  Some of the 
impact of this can now be seen in official statistics, with for 
example, the average weekly hours of work falling in 
Scotland across most categories of employment. So, the 
average for all workers has dropped from 32.2 hours to 32 
hours, a fall of -0.6%, while the average for full-time workers 
has dropped from 36.9 hours to 36.7 hours, a fall of -0.5%.  
 
To the extent that it is more easy to cut labour hours via 
short-time working than it once was, then employers may be 
less likely to make workers redundant in the short-run.  
Productivity per hour will not drop by as much as 
productivity per worker and coupled with lower labour 
payments competitiveness will suffer less.  But it is arguable 
that a flexible labour market also makes it easier to 
dispense with the services of workers. If the recession is 
expected to persist, or the recovery expected to be very 
sluggish, then job shedding could pick up and 
unemployment continue to rise. Moreover, given that many 
workers are now on reduced hours and worker productivity 
low then a recovery in demand for goods and services and 
rising output may be met, initially at least, more by a rise in 
hours worked per worker than an increase in job creation.
 
 
Macro policy and the UK and Scottish 
economies 
We hold the view that without the significant injection of 
demand made possible by a monetary and fiscal policy 
expansion, the UK and Scotland, along with the US and 
many other key economies, would in all likelihood have 
experienced a loss of output comparable to that of the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. In the UK the programme of 
monetary expansion, known as quantitative easing, has 
injected around £200 billion into the UK economy.  Yet, as 
the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King,  pointed 
out in his speech at the University of Exeter on 19 January 
2010, the growth in stock of broad money in the UK  
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Figure 5:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q3 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
%
Year
Scottish Financial Services
UK Financial Services
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2009q3 
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economy, while positive, is still much below the 5% to 10% 
annual rate of growth experienced in normal circumstances. 
In the United States the growth of money stock is virtually 
static and in Europe it is slightly negative. These figures 
provide an indication of the scale and significance of the 
contraction in bank balance sheets due to the 'credit 
crunch'. Without the programme of quantitative easing the 
monetary squeeze on the UK economy would have been, in 
the Governor's words, 'potentially disastrous'.  
 
Similarly, the fiscal injection has sought to compensate for 
the significant drop in private sector demand for British 
goods and services as households and companies sought 
to reduce their high indebtedness. The most striking 
example of this is the rapid rise in the household saving 
ratio, which is shown in Figure 9. The ratio was negative in 
the first quarter of 2008 (-0.7%) but as recession started to 
bite it rose sharply, so that by in 2009 Q3 it had risen by 7.7 
percentage points above the same quarter a year earlier to 
8.6%. This was, as the Bank of England notes in its 
February Inflation Report: "the largest four-quarter increase 
in the saving ratio since records began in 1955." This 
outcome is further underlined by Figure 10, which shows the 
financial balances of the public, private and foreign sectors 
as a percentage of UK national income since 1955. In 
accounting terms all balances sum to zero. From the figure 
it is clear that the foreign surplus or deficit on UK current 
account has persisted for some time, at least since the late 
1990s. But the big recent movements are the rapid growth 
in the public sector deficit as the private sector balance went 
from negative to positive, paralleling the rise in the 
household saving ratio. The figure shows that much the 
same happened in the early 1990's UK recession. 
 
As a result of this, the UK now has public sector deficit that 
stands at 12.6% of national income and according to IMF 
estimates the structural, or permanent non-cyclical, 
component amounts to 7.8% points. A structural deficit of 
nearly 8% of GDP is clearly unsustainable. UK public sector 
net debt stands currently just under 60% of GDP and with 
present assumptions of GDP growth and likely interest rates 
the net debt position would reach 100% of GDP in 5 or six 
years.  While net debt of 100% of GDP, if stabilised, need 
not be unsustainable, the level of  interest payments on the 
debt will begin to crowd out other public sector expenditure. 
On present policies the 2009 Pre-Budget Report  UK net 
debt is forecast to be around 80% of GDP in 2014-15, which 
as Figure 11 shows is not wholly unusual by historical 
standards. 
 
Figure 11 reveals that for half of the twentieth century net 
debt levels were above 80% of GDP. This of course 
embraces extreme circumstances such as both World Wars 
but those events led to net debt levels considerably above 
100%, which is no way currently in prospect for Britain. 
 
The IMF estimated in November 2009 that on current 
policies UK net interest payments will rise from 1.6% of 
GDP in 2007 to 3.1% in 2014. This is not trivial and would 
amount to around £50 billion per year from £35 billion in 
2009. Yet, the IMF forecasts that 6 of the G-20 countries 
would have a net interest payment share of GDP in 2014 
greater than the UK: Italy (6.2%), India (5.6%), Turkey 
(5.4%), United States (4.5%), Brazil (4.3%) and France 
(3.2%).  The average for all the advanced G-20 countries is 
also forecast to be greater (3.5%). (Greece is not included in 
the analysis). A 3.1% net interest payment share of GDP 
would according to the IMF amount to 8.3% of UK fiscal 
revenues. Figure 12 indicates that net interest payments of 
at least 3% of GDP per annum existed for seventy five years 
between 1916 and 1991, which should put the present crisis 
into context. Some experts argue that it is only when debt 
interest payments rise to 12% of GDP that a government is 
likely to default (see 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/debt_brief.php
 ). This 
may be too high and it seems not unlikely that a default 
could occur before interest payments reached a third of 
fiscal revenues - the likely analogue of 12% of GDP.  
 
In view of this background we believe it is incorrect, as 
some commentators have done, to suggest that the UK is in  
the same category as Greece in terms of risk of default . As 
the BBC's Economics Editor, Stephanie Flanders, has 
pointed out, the fact that the UK has a budget deficit that's 
comparable to Greece is not sufficient to put the UK into the 
same category as Greece. The main differences are: 
 
x the debt to GDP ratio is currently well over 110% in 
Greece and under 60% in the UK; 
x Greek debt servicing costs are now just under 12% 
of GDP, in the current debt costs are under 3% of 
GDP; 
x the average maturity of UK sovereign debt is 14 
years, compared to 4 years in the US, 6 or 7years 
in France and Germany, and in Greece it is even 
lower with 10% of debt maturing in a few months. 
So, despite the size of the UK budget deficit, 
Germany, France and Italy, will all issue absolutely 
more sovereign debt on the markets than the UK in 
2010; 
x Greece has a severe competitiveness problem, 
which the country is unable to address 
independently through a downward exchange rate 
adjustment. The UK current account deficit stands 
at only 2.5% of GDP and we have experienced a 
25% devaluation since before the recession in mid 
2007. Greece has a current account deficit of 11% 
of GDP and no way of addressing this, if it remains 
within the eurozone, other than domestic 
downward adjustment of wages, other costs and 
prices. The UK has a basis for recovery higher 
GDP, higher tax revenues and lower public 
spending on transfer payments, which is denied 
Greece. 
 
The UK is not Greece. But there is a lesson to be learnt 
from the Greek experience and it is this: granting full fiscal 
autonomy to a country/region within a larger monetary union 
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Figure 7:  GVA Change over the recession to Q3 2009 or latest trough 
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Figure 8:  Output and jobs in the recession 
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runs the risk of a fiscal crisis that can threaten the union 
because the financial markets will not discipline fiscal laxity 
in any one country/region sufficiently early enough. The 
discipline needs to come from the political centre and that 
means that complete fiscal autonomy is ruled out, although  
some degree of fiscal devolution is clearly  feasible.  
 
All of this is not to deny the need for a sizable adjustment in 
the UK's fiscal position. There is a case to argue that the 
government needs to set out in its March Budget a more 
credible and more clearly specified programme of fiscal 
tightening over the next five years than it did in the 2009 
Pre-Budget Report. The IMF points out that removal of a 
structural deficit of the scale present in the UK - just under 
8% of GDP - is not unprecedented. More than 20 advanced 
economies achieved improvements in their structural fiscal  
balances of 5% of GDP or more at least once in the past 40 
years, while 10 countries achieved improvements in excess 
of 10% of GDP in that period. The UK government can and 
must do this. But there is room for debate around timing.  
 
As Andrew Sentance of the Bank of England notes, the 
current  problem of an imbalance between a large private 
surplus on the one hand and a large budget deficit on the 
other, is very similar to the situation that faced the UK in 
1993 after the previous recession. The deficit in 1993 stood 
at 7.8% of GDP and this was reduced to 2% of national 
income in 1997 and a small surplus in 1998. A series of 
budgets raised taxes and restricted public expenditure but 
the process was also helped by reasonable GDP growth of 
3% per annum. A more competitive pound sterling, as now, 
assisted the recovery along with a strong recovery in 
domestic private spending. The principle difference between 
now and then is that private spending is likely to be more 
constrained now due to the legacy of the financial crisis. The 
household sector has had to adjust from the significant 
deficit that emerged in the mid-2000s. It has now moved 
back to balance, as evidenced by the rise in the savings 
ratio noted above. But the question is how much further 
does the sector have to go in building up a financial surplus 
before it starts to raise its spending relative to income 
again? This is  a key difference from the early 1990s when 
households were already in surplus having recovered from a 
move into deficit in the late 1980s. In addition, corporate 
surpluses are bigger than at the end of the 1990s recession 
and there is a question to be raised about how long these 
will be sustained before spending on re-stocking and new 
investment occurs. 
 
It is because of this uncertainty about household and 
corporate spending that we have for some time urged 
caution about the timing of a fiscal consolidation. The UK 
and Argentina are the only two G-20 countries to have 
withdrawn their fiscal stimulus in 2010. The UK will still 
benefit from the effects of the automatic stabilisers but the 
overall fiscal stance in 2010-11 is shown by the 2009 Pre-
Budget Report to be negative. In our view this is dangerous 
given that UK households have the most adjustments to 
make to their balance sheets than households in other 
countries because the level of household debt was pre-crisis 
so high here. If the growth of world trade does start to pick 
up appreciably and this is likely later this year the UK should 
benefit disproportionately. Then there will be a real prospect 
of what the Bank of England and the government desires: a 
switch to export and investment led growth. But until that 
time given relatively flat household and corporate spending, 
a fiscal tightening in 2010, the ending of further quantitative 
easing this month, and the likely continuing sluggishness of 
bank lending, increases the risk of a double-dip recession 
this year. 
 
 
Forecasts 
The underlying economic situation has not changed 
significantly since we last reported in late November 2009. 
The UK economy crept out of recession in 2009q4. Scottish 
outturn data for the fourth quarter will not be available until 
April, so we must rely on surveys for information on the 
most recent performance.  
 
The Review of Business Surveys section makes clear that 
the Scottish economy is in a better position than it was a 
year ago. But the review also makes clear that business 
sales and optimism trends in the fourth quarter were not as 
strong as the third quarter. There is concern that the 
Scottish economy faltered in the fourth quarter and this 
concern has carried over into the first quarter of this year 
with weaker retail sales data than south of the border, and 
unemployment, in the latest data for the final quarter of last 
year, rising at a faster rate, not only than the rest of the UK, 
but also western Europe. Mixed messages are also coming 
from the housing market with both the Lloyds TSB Scotland 
and Halifax Bank of Scotland producing surveys indicating 
falling Scottish house prices: -6.8% in the quarter to the end 
of January compared with a year before in the former, and  
-7% over the year to the end of December, nearly agrees, in 
the latter. In contrast, the UK Department of Communities 
and (English) Local Government announced on the same 
day that Scottish prices in the year to the end of December 
had risen by 3.8%. 
 
None of this bodes well for the growth of Scottish household 
spending, which accounts for 42% of Scottish final demand. 
It is likely, however, that the Scottish Retail Consortium data 
for January are much influenced by one-off events such as 
the reinstatement of the temporary reduction in VAT at the 
end of the year, which may have led to some spending 
being brought forward. Moreover, the poor weather after 
Christmas in the New Year may have curtailed spending in 
January. But with weak house prices, rising unemployment 
and many households still seeking to adjust their personal 
balance sheets through higher saving, it seems unlikely that 
there will be much revival in spending in the first quarter of 
this year and perhaps the second quarter as well. We have 
noted that public spending will begin to tighten this year, 
although it is not predicted to begin falling until 2011. 
Investment looks to be weak, although some improvement 
in investment trends was noted in the latest Scottish 
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Figure 9:  UK household savings ratio 2008q1 to 2009q3 (% of household income) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  UK financial imbalances since 1955 – percent of national income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Andrew Sentence speech, November 2009, Bank of England 
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Figure 11:  UK net debt to GDP 1900 to 2011 
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Figure 12:  UK debt interest to GDP 1900 to 2011 
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Chambers’ Business Survey (SCBS) but not in the CBI and 
Scottish Engineering surveys. However, there is stronger 
evidence that exports are beginning to pick up.  In the latest 
Scottish business survey  rising trends in export orders are 
observed, although in the SCBS the trend was weaker in the 
fourth quarter than in the third quarter 0f 2009. 
 
Our latest forecasts for the Scottish economy have been 
prepared against the economic and policy background 
considered above and discussed in considerable detail 
along with the forecasts in the section on Forecasts of the 
Scottish Economy below. 
Given the continuing climate of uncertainty and the 
significant data revisions to both Scottish and First Release 
UK data, we adopt the practice of recent Fraser Economic 
Commentaries and present three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy: we label the scenario that we feel is most likely 
“central”, with “high growth” and “low growth” as two 
respectively upper and lower growth alternatives. The 
“central” scenario is that which is most likely, while the “high 
growth” and “low growth” scenarios reveal the range of 
possible outcomes for the Scottish economy foreseen for 
future developments from 2009 through 2010 to 2012. 
 
 
GVA Forecasts 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -4.7 1.7 2.2 2.8 
November forecast -4.9 1.6 1.8 2.1 
Central -4.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 
November forecast -5.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 
Low growth -4.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.8 
November forecast -5.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -60,488 -9,785 30,253 57,213 
June forecast -62,827 -23,152 33,584 45,174 
Central  -64,218 -32,264 18,277 44,612 
June forecast -84,399 -51,451 11,301 26,824 
Low growth -77,861 -57,002 -16,538 13,631 
June forecast 103,579 -66,894 -3,722 6,847 
 
 
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
 2009      2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 7.6%      7.3% 5.6% 3.6% 
Central 7.6%      8.1% 7.3% 6.3% 
Numbers 200,082 216,200 185,700 144,200 
Low growth 7.6% 9.9% 10.1% 9.8% 
     
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.9% 4.4% 3.4% 2.4% 
Central 4.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.7% 
Numbers 136,821 148,000 127,000 99,000 
Low growth 4.9% 6.8% 7.0% 6.7% 
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The key forecasts are summarised in Table 1 along with our 
November forecasts for comparison. We shall primarily 
focus on our central forecast here. It is clear that we have 
revised upwards slightly our GVA forecast for 2009 to 
 -4.8%. The narrow gap between the forecasts on the three 
scenarios for 2009 is mainly due to the fact that we already 
have three of the four quarters of outturn data. Scotland is 
forecast to return to positive growth in 2010. But the 
recovery over the year is weak, household spending 
strengthens but continues to fall. Exports to the rest of the 
world continue to recover and at a faster rate than predicted 
in November. This along with some recovery of investment, 
though still negative, helps raise the forecast to 0.6% growth 
compared to our prediction of 0.1% in November. Recovery 
is weaker in Scotland than in the UK for the reasons that 
were well rehearsed in the previous Commentary and we 
see no basis for altering that view. Scottish GVA growth is 
better than the UK on the High growth scenario only. Trend 
growth is realised on our Central scenario in 2012. 
 
Employment Forecasts 
The key forecasts are summarised in Table 2. Employee job 
losses continue from 2009 into 2010, with a net 96,000 jobs 
lost in those two years and not fully matched by job gains of 
63,000 in 2011 and 2012. At the sectoral level, services 
experiences the greatest decline in jobs in 2009 and 2010 
with 42,000 net jobs lost. Job losses in financial services 
accounts for 16,500 of the service sector job losses. 
Construction job losses amount to nearly 27,000 over the 
two years and as with services the number of construction 
jobs in 2012 remains below 2008 levels but there is 
recovery in 2011 and 2012 of more than 3,000 jobs. Finally, 
the production sector which principally includes 
manufacturing sheds more than 17,000 jobs in 2009 and 
2010 but through strong export growth net job creation in 
2011 and 2012 of 26,000. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3 above. On our Central forecast  ILO unemployment is 
expected to peak at 216,000 or 8.1% this year falling to just 
under 186,000 or 7.3% in 2011 and further to 144,000 or 
6.3% in 2012. However, if the recent trend in Scottish 
unemployment continues, which we think less likely, the rate 
could rise on our low growth scenario to 9.9%, or 264,000, 
this year, reaching a rate peak of 10.1%, or 257,000, in 
2011 and then falling to 9.8%, or 224,000, in 2012. 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
19 February 2010 
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Economic background 
In the three months since our forecasts in November 2009, 
several notable developments have occurred which will 
impact on the short- and medium-term growth prospects for 
the Scottish economy. Within the Scottish economy, we 
have continued to see GVA falling, with the most recent 
data for Q3 2009 confirming six consecutive quarters of 
declining activity. These data confirm that Scottish GVA has 
declined 6.1% since Q2 2008, while the UK as a whole 
down 5.7% over the same period. 
 
These figures have drawn an unprecedented monetary and 
fiscal response, which we have examined in detail in 
previous forecasts. In February 2010, the Bank of England 
(Bank of England, 2010a) kept interest rates at 0.5% (where 
they have been since March 2009), and announced that it 
was curtailing its programme of Quantitative Easing (QE) 
following the purchase of £200 billion of assets funded by 
the issuance of Central Bank reserves, which was 
introduced in Spring 2009. The Monetary Policy Committee, 
charged with maintaining price stability in the UK and with 
the power to set interest rates to deliver a medium-term 
inflation target of 2%, voted to stop extending the QE 
programme in February 2009, after previous meetings had 
increased the scale of the programme in stages from an 
initial £50 billion. It noted in the most recent inflation report 
(Bank of England, 2010a) that broad money growth 
remained low, although it argued that money growth without 
the QE programme would have been even lower. The 
overall assessment of the policy interventions of the Bank is 
likely to be made only in the fullness of time, however there 
is some evidence that the slowdown in the growth of money 
was lower given the slowdown in nominal GDP when 
compared to previous recessions. 
 
On the fiscal policy side, as well as the temporary VAT 
reduction being reversed, with VAT returning to 17.5% from 
January 2010,  the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced 
in November’s Pre-Budget Report (PBR) a series of 
programmes aimed at fiscal consolidation over the medium 
term (with the stated target of reducing Public Sector Net 
Borrowing from a forecasted 12.6% of GDP in 2009-10 to 
5.5% of GDP in 2013-14). The headline measures 
announced in the PBR include an increase in the rate of 
National Insurance by 0.5% from April 2011, as well as a 
“temporary payroll tax” of 50% on discretionary bonus 
payments above £25,000, which is forecast to raise £550 
million in the current financial year. Of direct relevance to 
Scotland, as we shall examine in detail later, is the timing 
and depth of the period over which fiscal consolidation is 
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projected to occur. This will be of crucial significance for the 
ability of the public sector to continue to support activity and 
employment over the short and medium-term. At the start of 
February, the Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish 
Government’s budget for 2010-11, setting in place spending 
plans for some £35 billion of Total Managed Expenditure for 
the coming financial year. 
 
As noted in previous Forecasts, part of the significant 
rebalancing in the economy likely in the medium-term is that 
government net borrowing is likely to be reduced 
significantly. In 2009-10 it is forecast to be £178 billion in 
2009-10, roughly 57% of UK GDP. Irrespective of the 
political party which wins the UK general election likely to 
fall in May 2010, as Bank of England Governor Mervyn King 
notes, “there is a broad consensus across all political parties 
on the need later this year to announce more clearly the 
measures required for fiscal consolidation” (Bank of 
England, 2010b, p. 16-17).  
 
We discuss the likely implications of this fiscal consolidation 
for the scale of government spending in Scotland in a later 
section of this forecast. At this point we note that 
government spending in Scotland in each of our three 
scenarios presented forecast to see a real terms reduction 
from 2011 onwards. This is consistent with the figures 
presented in the most recent “State of the Economy” 
presentation by the Scottish Government’s Chief Economic 
Advisor in December 2009. This is likely to have a 
contractionary impact on Scottish growth and employment 
compared to the UK, to the extent that public sector 
employment in Scotland is slightly higher than in the UK as 
a whole (as the analysis of James (2009) referred to in the 
last Forecast made clear). Figures also presented by Chief 
Economic Advisor show that the largest contributions to UK 
GDP growth from 2010 are predicted to come from 
Consumption and Investment expenditures, with 
Government playing a much reduced role. 
 
The “State of the Economy” also noted the important role 
that the adjustment of personal balance sheets will make a 
vital contribution to the duration of the downturn. At the 
household level, paying down debts incurred for expenditure 
yesterday necessarily reduces spending available for 
consumption today. There are experimental data for 
Scottish households which indicate that, in aggregate, 
Scottish households have curtailed total spending more 
sharply than UK households as a whole. These data only 
run to Q2 2009, so the likely path of future consumption 
growth in Scotland, and that of the UK, remains uncertain. 
These same experimental data suggest that over the last 
decade there has been little difference between the growth 
in household consumption in Scotland compared to the UK 
as a whole. 
 
It continues to be the case, however, that we might expect 
the recession-recovery path of Scotland to be different from 
that of the UK. Indeed, we would be surprised if Scotland 
was to recover at precisely the same rate as the UK as a 
whole. As well as the larger public sector in Scotland, with a 
greater share of employment in public sector than the UK as 
a whole, this has often been argued to insulate Scottish 
growth and employment, and so produce “flatter” growth – 
less pronounced troughs and less steep peaks. While this 
continues to be the case, we are reminded that the nature of 
the recent recession was profoundly different to any in 
recent history as it was linked with a shortage of credit 
availability – the so-called “credit crunch”, which peaked in 
September 2008. This has had profound impacts on sectors 
where Scotland traditionally held a strong competitive 
position, including financial services and insurance. Further, 
Charles Bean (Deputy Governor of the Bank of England) in 
questions about the recent growth of the UK said that “the 
downturn that we’ve gone through is heavily manufacturing-
centred, a sharp fall in investment and stocks. And the UK is 
somewhat less manufacturing intensive than some of our 
counterparts. That’s meant that we didn’t suffer as sharp a 
contraction in activity as, say, Japan’s did, but equally the 
rebound hasn’t been quite as strong” (bank of England, 
2010b, p. 15). Taking this analogy to the Scotland, Scotland 
is more manufacturing intensive than the UK as a whole 
(14.1% compared to 13.3%), and so this could explain the 
larger fall seen in Scotland than the UK, between Q2 2008 
and Q3 2009. The characteristics and features of the 
recession, and the differing impacts on the UK and Scotland 
will only become fully apparent in time, as sometimes 
substantial revisions seen to previous data reduce as more 
accurate information is available. We note the scale of 
previous revisions to aggregate GVA growth in Scotland in 
Box 1.  
 
Across the world, the synchronised nature of this recession 
is clearly evident with most developed countries 
experiencing significant lost output through 2009. The 
OECD in November 2009’s Economic Outlook project 
declines in GDP across the OECD countries, with output 
falling in the US (-2.5%), Japan (-5.3%) and the UK (-4.7%). 
Australia (0.8%), Korea (0.1%) and Poland (1.4%) are 
predicted to be the only OECD countries to escape a 
reduction in GDP in 2009. The recession is thus confirmed 
as a worldwide downturn, affecting countries in all corners of 
the world. Interestingly however, the IMF has recently 
revised up its projections for world growth in 2010 and 2011 
(IMF, 2010). World trade is forecast to have contracted by 
12.3% in 2009 but is now predicted to grow by 5.8% in 
2010. 
 
We discuss these in more detail where we lay out our 
assumptions about the growth rate for Scottish exports to 
the rest of the world later in this Forecast. For Scotland, it 
will be crucial that exports are able to recover, although this 
could well be helped by the significant reduction in the 
Sterling exchange rate (down about a quarter from mid-
2007 levels (Bank of England, 2010a)) improving the 
competiveness of UK exports. The Bank of England (2010a) 
report that the contraction in world demand has not been 
offset by improved competitiveness since “a large part of the 
depreciation appears to have fed through to higher margins 
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Box 1: Recent revisions to GVA growth 
 
Revisions to the data on GVA growth for Scotland make forecasting the future path more uncertain, when even in smoother 
economic waters we would expect forecasted values to differ from the outturn variables observed. Preliminary estimates rely 
on less data than is available over time so we would expect some revisions.  As Mervyn King noted, concerning the UK GDP 
published by the ONS, “the data published are not… the truth, they are estimates. They are the single best estimate we’ve 
got from the ONS of GDP, but inevitably new information comes along with a lag and that leads them to revise their data” (p. 
22).  
 
Typically since the start of the recent recession, GVA estimates for Scotland have been revised upwards, with initial estimates 
being worse that those revealed by later estimates. In the most recent estimates of Scottish GVA (released in January 2010, 
for instance), Q3 and Q4 of 2008 were revised down 0.1% and 0.2% respectively, Q1 2009 was revised down 0.1%, and Q2 
2009 revised up by 0.1% compared to what had been published three months earlier. This had the impact of making 
Scotland’s entry to recession in 2008 more sudden than previously estimated, but reducing the depth of that recession 
slightly.  
 
Figure 1 shows the differences between estimates of GVA change for Scotland compared to most recent estimates of GVA 
growth for the same quarter since Q2 2008. Positive changes here show that the GVA change has been revised upwards, 
while negative changes show that most recent estimates are lower than the first estimates. 
 
 
 
Figure B1: Differences between first estimates and most recent estimates of GVA change in Scotland between  Q2 
2008 and Q2 2009 
 
 
 ?0.5
 ?0.4
 ?0.3
 ?0.2
 ?0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Q22008 Q32008 Q42008 Q12009 Q22009
 
PAGE 20 VOLUME 33  NUMBER 3 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY   
instead”.  Over time this should boost exports, and 
encourage increased supply of goods for export, although 
this could happen slowly as world demand growth recovers 
sluggishly. 
 
When thinking about the forecasts presented in this section, 
we agree with the caution of Mervyn King, who recently 
stated that “forecasts are not numbers which say this will 
happen. They are judgements about the relative 
probabilities of various outcomes occurring. And of course 
there is always a possibility of these outturns. Many things 
can happen” (Bank of England, 2010b, p. 11). 
 
The Scottish economy 
In the last quarter for which data are available (Q3 2009, 
published on 20th January 2010), the Gross Value Added 
(GVA) in Scotland fell by 0.2% from the previous quarter 
(Q2 2009), which had fallen by 0.5% compared to Q1 2009. 
Since Q2 2008, GVA in Scotland is down 6.1%, while the 
UK is down 5.7% over the same period. 
 
Scotland entered recession following the second 
consecutive quarterly decline in GVA in Q4 2008 and has 
now seen five quarters of negative GVA growth. The 
worsening economic performance is perhaps alleviating, 
with significant negative quarterly growth outcomes receding 
from view (despite some recent revisions to GVA). Although 
the future is by no means certain, downside risks remain to 
Scotland’s future growth prospects, we suggest that the size 
of the downturn seen through 2009 appears to be unlikely to 
continue through 2010. While the next years will be likely to 
see a cautious return to growth, it remains to be seen how 
much the experiences from 2008-2009 will damage 
confidence across domestic and overseas consumers.  
 
The Scottish manufacturing sector, accounting for 14.1% of 
Scottish GVA, was up slightly (0.3) over the third quarter of 
2009, albeit that this sector has seen a decline of 9.6% over 
the year to Q3. The manufacturing sector is down 11.9% 
from its Q2 2008 peak. Within production sectors more 
generally, the largest yearly decline is in the mining and 
quarrying industries (down 12.4%) and down 15.8% from 
Q2 2008.  
 
Construction in Scotland (accounting for 6.5% of GVA) was 
down 1.6% on Q2 2009, and down 8.9% on the year. In all, 
the sector was down 13.0% on the peak seen in Q2 2008. 
 
The aggregate Services sector is down 0.3% on the 
previous quarter, down 3.5% over the year to Q3, and down 
4.7% from the Q2 2008 peak. This would suggest that the 
major impact to date of the Scottish recession has affected 
on manufacturing and production sectors in the Scottish 
economy. While the services sector has seen high profile 
causalities in the banking and business services sector, and 
the “credit crunch” originated in these industries, it has been 
the Manufacturing and Production sectors which have, to 
date, seen the biggest falls in GVA. This would indicate that 
Charles Bean’s assertion that, at the UK level, “the 
downturn that we’ve got through is heavily manufacturing 
centred, a sharp fall in investment and stocks. And the UK is 
obviously less manufacturing intensive that some of our 
counterparts. That’s meant that we didn’t suffer as sharp a 
contraction in activity as, say, Japan did, but equally the 
rebound hasn’t been quite as strong” (p. 15).  Within the UK, 
the manufacturing sector is a larger share of activity in 
Scotland than the UK (14.1% compared to 13.3%) which 
could be a contributing factor for Scotland performing more 
weakly than the UK as a whole.  
 
Labour market developments in Scotland to the end of 
November 2009 (published in January 2010) showed falling 
employment and increasing unemployment over the year; 
however the quarterly change was not negative on all 
measures. Employment of those aged over 16 between 
September and November stood at 2,511 thousand, down 
28,000 (or 1.1%) on the same period one year previously, 
and actually up 6 thousand on the previous quarter. The 
employment rate for those of working age (16 to 59 (for 
women) and 16 to 64 (for men)) was up slightly from the 
previous three month period, standing at 74.0%, however 
this was lower than the 75.5% seen in the same quarter one 
year previously.  
 
Looking at unemployment, the number of people over the 
age of 16 who were unemployed rose by 9,000 compared to 
the three months previous, and up 61,000 over the last year, 
approximately twice the rise reported in the last commentary 
for the year to April 2009, and as of September to 
November 2009, the ILO level of unemployment stood at 
202 thousand. The preliminary estimate of those receiving 
unemployment-related benefits stood at 136,200 in 
December 2009. The claimant count figure is up 36,700 
since September 2008, and the claimant count rate has 
risen from 3.6% at the start of 2009, and now stands at 
4.9%. We present our forecasts for the Scottish labour 
market for 2009, and through 2010 to 2012 later in this 
section. 
 
 
Final demand and recent trends 
The Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) forecasting model 
acknowledges the drivers of economic activity in the 
Scottish economy to be consumption, government 
spending, investment, tourism and exports (to the rest of the 
UK and the rest of the World). For all three scenarios 
considered the recent trends in each of these measures, as 
well as recent survey evidence, are discussed below.  
 
 
Consumption 
x Data being developed by the Scottish Government 
through the Scottish National Accounts Project 
(SNAP) were published on the 5th of February 
2010. These showed that Q3 2009 saw a small 
upward rebound in household expenditure, 
following three quarters of reductions. These 
figures are in Nominal terms however, so the real 
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increase in spending will be lower, and may be 
negative. This confirms the evidence from previous 
quarters that the reduction in household 
expenditure is moderating, but it is unlikely that this 
small positive growth in nominal expenditure is 
signalling a return to strong positive growth in 
household consumption expenditure. 
 
x As previously noted in Forecasts, household credit 
facilities have been crucial for the recent growth of 
expenditure, and the movement of the Scottish 
economy towards a more service-oriented 
structure. The decline in the availability of credit 
facilities to households, as well as households 
continued reluctance to take on credit in uncertain 
economic conditions, will continue to dampen 
household spending. The link between house price 
growth and household spending is anecdotally 
important, and recently house prices have fallen by 
less than in earlier quarters. Total house sales 
remain weak, with sales down roughly one half. 
 
x Figures released by the Scottish Retail Consortium 
reported the worst January for four years, with like-
for-like sales falling by 0.6% compared to January 
2009. Non-food sales were down 1.8% on the 
previous year.  The SRC noted the impact of the 
reinstatement of VAT after its temporary reduction, 
with the possibility of sales being brought forward 
from January to the end of 2009. This, combined 
with the poor weather conditions for much of 
January, saw consumers appearing to reduce 
spending on discretionary items. It will be crucial 
for the path of the retail sector, and consumer 
expenditure more generally, that February and 
future months’  figures  indicate if January’s  
figures are a blip or part of a longer term correction 
to household balance sheets. Recent survey 
evidence, largely capturing small and independent 
retailers, indicates falling business confidence and 
expecting declining sales through the first quarter 
of 2010. 
 
Government spending 
x As noted above and in previous Forecasts, fiscal 
policy measures provided a stimulus designed to 
support activity and employment through the 
declines in growth seen in late 2008 and 2009. The 
UK stimulus package was estimated by the IMF to 
be of the order of 1.6% of GDP in 2009.There 
continues to be considerable uncertainty over the 
impact that the removal of these packages, 
necessary to restore confidence in the 
sustainability of the budgets of governments across 
the world, will have on economic activity. What will 
be crucial will be the speed at which private sector 
and consumption growth can provide a 
counterbalance  to the removal of the government 
stimulus.  A recent report by the IMF noted, for the 
G20 countries, 2010 will see the removal of the 
fiscal stimulus in only the UK and Argentina.    
 
x Bearing this in mind, in his December 2009 “State 
of the Economy” report, Scotland’s Chief Economic 
Advisor noted that for spending controlled by the 
Scottish Government through the Departmental 
Expenditure Levels, which make up the principal 
element of discretionary spending by the Scottish 
Government, will grow by over 4% in 2009/10, but 
will fall in real terms in 2010/11. The next three 
years are within the period of the next Spending 
Review, but, based on Institute of Fiscal Studies 
analysis, are predicting real terms reductions of 
more than 2% from 2011/12 to 2013/14. Work by 
CPPR, published since the State of the Economy 
report, forecast real terms reductions in Scottish 
DEL of 4.2% in 2011/12 on the previous year, with 
subsequent budgets falling by 3.2% for the next 
two years in real terms.  
 
Investment 
x As previously noted, there are no separate national 
statistics on investment in Scotland. Business 
investment figures reported for the UK, which may 
typically be expected to be indicative of the path of 
investment in Scotland, show continued large 
declines in investment through 2009. Total 
business investment in Q3 2009 was down 19.9% 
on the same quarter one year previously, although 
Q3 had seen a small upward trend, largely driven 
by a 10% increase in investment in Distribution 
services (although business investment was down 
27.5% in this sector on Q3 2008). Private sector 
manufacturing continued to see a decline in 
investment, down 4.4% in Q3 on Q2, and down 
29.9% on Q3 in 2008.  
 
Tourism 
x Figures from the International Passenger Survey 
showed that the number of international trips to 
Scotland was down 0.3% in July to September 
2009 compared to the same period in 2008. This is 
the largest quarter for tourism in Scotland, with 
almost half of the trips to Scotland in 2009 made in 
these three months. We noted in November’s 
Forecast that the occupancy figures had been 
maintained or improved from those from the same 
periods in 2008, and that this may have been at the 
expense of discounting of hotel accommodation. 
The most recent GVA figures for Scotland indicate 
that there has indeed been a small decline in GVA 
over the most recent quarter (-2.3%), while GVA in 
this sector is down 5.2% in the last four quarters on 
the previous four quarters. The Q3 decline in this 
sector is less than that seen in Q2 2009, with most 
recent survey evidence indicating that business 
optimism in the sector is significantly higher than 
the same period in 2008.
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Table 1:  Growth forecasts for top five export markets for ROW exports from Scotland, % year on year change, plus 
United Kingdom and Euro Area 
 
  2010 2011 
  IMF (Oct2009) IMF (Jan2010) OECD IMF (Oct2009) IMF (Jan2010 OECD 
1 United States 1.5 2.7 2.5 n/a 2.4 2.8 
2 France 0.9 1.4 1.4 n/a 1.7 1.7 
3 Germany 0.3 1.9 1.4 n/a 1.9 1.9 
4 The Netherlands 0.7 n/a 0.7 n/a n/a 2.0 
5 Ireland -2.5 n/a -2.3 n/a n/a 1.0 
        
 United Kingdom 0.9 1.3 1.2 n/a 2.7 2.2 
 Euro Area 0.3 1.0 0.9 n/a 1.6 1.7 
 
 
Sources: International monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook:  Europe, Securing Recovery, October 2009, and World Economic Outlook 
Update, January 2010, and OECD Economic Outlook, November 2009. 
 
Table 2:  Main forecasts of the Scottish economy (Central scenario), 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gross Value Added -4.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 
     
Manufacturing -10.2 0.9 4.0 5.8 
Construction -8.1 2.8 3.3 1.7 
Services -3.1 0.3 0.8 1.3 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Forecasts for aggregate GVA growth in the Scottish economy under three scenarios, 2009-2012, % 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
High growth -4.7 1.7 2.2 2.8 
Central -4.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 
Low growth -4.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.8 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Forecasts of Scottish employment (jobs, 000s) and net employment change in central scenario, 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total jobs (000s) 2,321 2,289 2,307 2,351 
Net annual change (jobs) -64,218 -32,264 18,277 44,612 
% change from previous year -2.7 -1.4 0.8 1.9 
     
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 23.2 23.5 24.1 25.1 
Annual change -9850 309 628 1061 
Production (jobs, 000s) 240.0 234.6 244.9 260.7 
Annual change -11971 -5411 10260 15797 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 121.4 113.3 114.4 116.3 
Annual change -18577 -8135 1143 1905 
Services (jobs, 000s) 1936.2 1917.2 1923.4 1949.2 
Annual change -23820 -19027 6246 25850 
 
Note: Figures are numbers of employee jobs, by industry, and not the numbers in employment, therefore these figures differ slightly from those 
reported in the labour market section of the Economic Commentary. 
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Table 5:  Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High scenario -60,488 -9,785 30,253 57,213 
Central scenario -64,218 -32,264 18,277 44,612 
Low Scenario -77,861 -57,002 -16,538 13,631 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Forecasts of Scottish unemployment, central scenario 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
ILO unemployment  200,082 216,200 185,700 144,200 
Rate1 7.6% 8.1% 7.3% 6.3% 
Claimant count 136,821 148,000 127,000 99,000 
Rate2 4.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.7% 
 
Notes: 1 = rate calculated as total ILO unemployed divided by total of economically active 16+ population. 2 = rate calculated as claimant count 
divided by sum of claimant count and total jobs. The latest estimates of the 2009 figures forecast in November’s commentary were published in 
January 2010 in the Labour Market Statistics First Release for Scotland. These estimated the ILO unemployment levels and rates for the three 
months to November 2009 as 202,000 and 7.4%, respectively. We leave the forecasts for 2009 unchanged from that forecast in November’s 
commentary. The same publication gave preliminary estimates of the claimant count and rate for December 2009 as 136,200 and 4.9%. Again, 
our figures in Table 6 above for the claimant count and rate are left unchanged from those published in November 2009’s commentary. 
 
 
Table 7:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 7.6% 7.3% 5.6% 3.6% 
Central 7.6% 8.1% 7.3% 6.3% 
Low growth 7.6% 9.9% 10.1% 9.8% 
     
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.9% 4.4% 3.4% 2.4% 
Central 4.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.7% 
Low growth 4.9% 6.8% 7.0% 6.7% 
 
 
 
While demand remains weak, however, Chamber 
of Commerce respondents indicated that 
discounting is set to continue in the first quarter of 
2010. 
 
Exports to the rest of the UK  
x Preliminary estimates of GDP for the UK, published 
on the 26th of January 2010, revealed that Q9 
2009 saw the first quarter of positive growth (0.1%) 
since Q1 2008, with many analysts and 
commentators predicting the end of the UK 
recession. With the rest of the UK being the most 
important trading partner for Scottish industries, the 
future for demand for Scottish exports will depend 
crucially on the path of growth which occurs in the 
UK. As noted previously, Scottish IO tables for 
2004 showed that exports to the rest of the UK 
were approximately double exports from Scotland 
to the rest of the World. With regard to the estimate 
of GDP growth in the UK, we note however, that 
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many analysts were predicting stronger growth in 
Q4 2009 than the observed 0.1%, and that (as we 
saw above for Scotland, but also for the UK) there 
have been sometimes significant revisions to GDP 
estimates over the last two years. 
 
x Recent forecasts for GDP growth in 2010 in the UK 
show a strong rebound from the declines seen in 
2009. The Treasury’s December 2009 forecasts 
predict growth between 1.0% and 1.5%. This range 
also includes the median forecast made in the last 
three months (1.3%), however the range of recent 
forecasts for the UK is from 0.7% to 2.2%. The 
range of UK forecasts has been revised upwards 
from those we reported in November’s 
Commentary, while the median new independent 
forecast has remained the same. 
 
x As noted elsewhere in this edition of the Fraser 
Economic Commentary, Scottish Chamber and 
CBI respondents reported in Q4 2009 rising trends 
in expected export orders, although demand from 
the rest of the UK remains fragile. 
 
Exports to the rest of the world  
x The IMF headlined its January 2010 forecasts for 
the global economy with the statement that “Real 
activity is rebounding, supported by extraordinary 
policy stimulus”. Their report pointed to rising 
confidence, with strong signs of the end of 
destocking and an increase in production, albeit 
with the recovery being “sluggish” in most 
advanced economies. World output is forecast to 
increase by 3.9% in 2010, and 4.3% in 2011, 
following a decline of 0.9% in 2009. Interestingly, 
and largely driven by revisions to their forecasts for 
the US, China and other important economies, 
these world forecasts have been revised upwards 
from October 2009’s forecasts. World trade as a 
whole was forecast in October 2009 to increase by 
2.5% in 2010, but the IMF is now forecasting a 
5.8% increase, with a 1.1% upwards revision to 
world trade forecast for 2011. The IMF’s forecasts 
for the UK was similarly increased in this period, 
and now stands at 1.3% - the same as the 
independent new median forecast discussed 
above.  
 
x As noted before, Scotland traditionally exports to 
EU and other “advanced economies”, which the 
IMF forecast will grow by 2.3% in 2010 and 2.4% in 
2011. The major traders for Scotland, and the 
recent forecasts for growth in these areas, are 
given in Table 1, as well as revisions from recent 
forecasts. 
 
x Despite these upward revisions for the major (non-
UK) destination for Scottish exports, growth 
continues to be forecast to be relatively slow to 
return in 2010, particularly for the EU economies. It 
is in developing countries that the highest forecasts 
for growth through 2010 and 2011 are found, and 
the success of an export-led recovery for Scotland 
may depend on the speed at which new markets in 
these previously less important export destinations 
can be found. 
 
x Experimental statistics have been published by the 
Scottish Government for manufacturing exports to 
the rest of the World to Q3 2009.  These data 
showed that Q3 2009 saw the first positive 
quarterly change in the aggregate real value of 
exports since Q1 of 2008, and followed five 
consecutive quarters of negative growth for 
aggregate exports. Within this aggregate however, 
the most recent quarter saw growth in exports in 
the important Food, Drink and Tobacco sector (up 
5.5% in real terms), as well as Chemicals, Coke, 
Refined Petroleum Products & Nuclear fuel (up 
9.94%). The important Engineering sectors, 
however, saw exports decline almost 8% in Q3, 
and are down almost 19% on Q3 2008. 
 
The forecasts: Background 
As with the forecasts published in the last four Economic 
Commentaries, we give three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy between 2009 and 2012. We give a “Central” 
case, with “High growth” and “Low growth” as two 
respectively upper and lower growth alternatives. We intend 
that these three scenarios capture the range of outcomes 
that are possible, given that there are considerable 
uncertainties surrounding any specific single or point 
estimates to the “Central” forecast. The significant revisions 
to GVA growth forecasts discussed above and seen over 
the last year, suggest that using a scenarios approach is 
sensible when first estimates of growth may be revised 
(sometimes, significantly) some quarters into the future.  
 
While we do not give explicit probabilities for each of these 
outcomes, we forecast that the “Central” scenario is that 
which is most likely, while “High growth” and “Low growth” 
reveal the range of possible outcomes for the Scottish 
economy from 2009 through to 2012. We will know the first 
estimates of Q4 2009 GVA for Scotland when the data are 
released in April 2010, allowing comparison between our 
three scenarios for the outturn of 2009 against the real 
economic data. 
 
The forecasts: Detail 
In the three scenarios considered, the following features are 
assumed to influence the factors of demand, and economic 
activity, across the Scottish economy: 
 
Household  
In the “Central” scenario, we forecast that the significant 
reduction in Household spending seen in 2009 moderates, 
but overall expenditure growth remains negative. Aggregate 
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Figure 1: GVA growth 2008 and forecasts to 2012, Scotland and the UK 
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Figure 2: Forecasts of GVA growth in Manufacturing, 2009-2012 
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Household expenditure in 2011 and 2012 is forecast to 
increase from weak 2010 levels. In “Low growth”, household 
expenditure is damaged through lower consumer 
confidence and persisting job security fears. Spending falls 
by more in 2010 in the low growth scenario than the central 
case, however less than all scenarios saw in 2009, and 
again falls (slightly) in 2011. It isn’t until 2012 that household 
spending sees a return to positive growth in “Low growth”. In 
“High growth”, consumer confidence (and spending) 
responds faster than in “Central”, returning to slightly 
positive growth in 2010 before seeing a return to pre-2008 
trend expenditure growth through 2011 and increasing 
marginally above trend in 2012. This scenario could be 
consistent with outturn unemployment increases being lower 
than anticipate, and household spending recovering through 
access to, and increased demand for, credit facilities for 
household spending.  
 
Government  
In “Central” we forecast an increase in government 
spending in Scotland through 2009 on 2008 levels, with a 
smaller increase in spending seen in 2010. From 2011, we 
forecast annual real terms reductions in aggregate 
Government spending in Scotland, which are reduced by 
over four per cent in 2012 compared to 2011. In “High 
growth”, government spending is still lower in 2011 and 
2012 compared to the previous year’s total, in part 
supported by additional economic activity keeping taxation 
income higher than is assumed in “Central”. Across all 
scenarios however, government spending in Scotland is 
lower. 
 
Exports 
In “Central” we anticipate a slow return to growth in world 
trade in 2010, with a return to strong positive growth in 
demand for Scottish exports from the rest of the world 
returning through 2011 and 2012. Such a response could be 
indicative of Scottish exports securing markets in developing 
economies, which are forecast to see high levels of 
economic growth over the coming years, while more 
developed countries are predicted to see slower increases 
in growth. Recent changes in growth forecasts for 
developed countries, and Scotland’s current exports to 
these countries, are discussed in the section above. In “High 
growth” and “Low growth”, this return to positive growth in 
exports to the rest of the world from Scotland takes less and 
more time, respectively. Exports to the rest of UK follow a 
similar pattern in the central case, returning to slowly 
positive growth in 2010. In “Low growth” we forecast a small 
increase in export demand from the rest of the UK in 2010. 
 
Tourism 
Tourism is forecast to recover slowly from the challenging 
conditions seen through 2008 and 2009, largely driven by 
(non-Scottish) households reducing expenditure on travel 
and tourism activities (in line with domestic households 
experiences of reduced overseas travel). In “Central”, 
tourism spending in aggregate is forecast to see a small 
decline in 2010, seeing a return to growth by 2011 continue 
through 2012. Under “High growth”, small positive growth in 
aggregate tourism spending is forecast for 2010, reflecting 
faster than anticipated recoveries in growth in markets 
important for Scottish tourism. 
 
Investment and stocks 
As discussed above, 2009 has seen significant reductions in 
investment demands. As we have previously stated, the 
recovery in investment will be partly driven by the supply of 
credit, but also the demand for credit from companies, which 
will be linked with returning business confidence. Recent 
survey evidence for manufacturing, responsible for much of 
the investment activity in the Scottish economy, give some 
ground for optimism with more respondents reporting 
upwards trends in investment than reported downward 
trends, for the first quarter since Q1 of 2008. This would 
suggest at the very least that the large falls in investments 
seen in 2009 will not be seen in 2010. We forecast in 
“Central” that aggregate investment levels will not recover 
significantly through 2010, but will  begin to increase from 
2011 and through 2012. “High growth” sees investment 
increasing from 2009 levels in 2010, although the increase 
is forecast to be small. 
 
Results 
 
Gross Value Added 
The forecast GVA for Scotland in 2009 under all three 
scenarios is negative, and significantly so. We forecast the 
GVA change at the end of the year when compared to the 
four quarters of the year before. All three scenarios forecast 
out to 2012, by which time Scottish GVA growth in all 
scenarios is forecast to be positive. As before, the recovery 
to positive economic growth occurs faster in the High growth 
scenario, and more slowly in the Low growth scenario. As 
stated above, we forecast that the Central scenario 
represents the most likely outcome for the Scottish economy 
given the current economic position and outlook at the start 
of 2010. Scotland is forecast to return to positive growth in 
2010 in both the Central (0.6%) and High growth (+1.7%) 
scenario, but the Low growth scenario sees negative growth 
in 2010 and 2011 (of -0.75% and -0.3% respectively). As 
noted above, considerable and multiple downside risks 
remain to the strength of the expected economic recovery 
for Scotland. 
 
These scenarios are presented in Figure 1, alongside (for 
comparison) the average of new forecasts (i.e. those made 
in the last three months to January 2010) for the UK as a 
whole in 2009 and 2010. Forecasts for the (medium-term) 
economic growth of the UK in 2011 and 2012 were collected 
by HM Treasury in November 2009, and these are also 
shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 3: Forecasts of GVA growth in Services, 2009-2012 
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Figure 4: Forecasts of GVA growth in Construction, 2009-2012 
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We are forecasting that the Scottish economy will perform 
better than the forecasts of the UK in 2009 and 2010 under 
the High growth scenario only, but less well under the most 
likely Central scenario. The average of recent independent 
forecasts for growth of the UK economy in 2010 is 1.4%, 
which, while a strong rebound from the declines seen in 
2009, is within our range of forecasts for Scotland. As with 
previous experience of recessions (discussed in detail in 
June 2009’s Fraser Economic Commentary), we anticipate 
the most likely outcome is for a slower return to growth in 
Scotland than the UK as a whole, with our Central scenario 
forecasting lower growth in Scotland than the average of 
independent forecasts for the UK in each year from 2010 to 
2012. 
 
Under the Central scenario, GVA growth returns to positive 
annual growth in 2010 (+0.6%) and 2011 (+1.6%). In 2012, 
Scottish growth is forecast to be 2.2%, slightly above long-
term trend growth for Scotland. Our central scenario for 
2009, and the forecast for the sectors under this scenario 
are given in Table 2. Table 3 shows the GVA forecasts 
under each of the three scenarios. Under the Low growth 
scenario, negative growth is also seen in 2009, 2010 and 
2011, with the Scottish economy not returning to positive 
growth in this scenario until 2012.  
 
We also present forecasts for GVA change in Scotland at 
broad industry levels for manufacturing and services, as well 
as the construction sector, under each of the three 
scenarios – Central, High growth and Low growth. Figure 2 
shows the GVA change in Manufacturing under each of 
these three scenarios, while Figure 3 shows the GVA 
change in Services. Figure 4 shows the change in 
forecasted GVA in the Construction sector between 2009 
and 2012. 
 
Across Manufacturing (shown in Figure 2), a recovery from 
the observed declines in GVA in 2009 occurs in 2010 in the 
Central scenario, although there is GVA growth of 3.4% 
forecast for 2010 under the High growth scenario. In 2011 
and 2012, all three scenarios forecast positive GVA growth 
in the manufacturing sector, with growth ranging from 0.0 to 
5.1% in 2011 and 2.7 to 6.8% in 2012. As noted in previous 
Forecasts, the speed the growth of external demand for 
products will be key to the short- and medium-term future for 
Scottish manufacturing.  
 
Figure 3 shows that Service sector GVA growth across the 
three scenarios is more insulated to the economic downturn 
than the Manufacturing figures seen in Figure 2. GVA 
growth in 2009 ranges from -3.0% to -3.2%, while in 2010 
GVA growth is forecast in the range from -0.5% to 1.0%. 
This range of outcomes has been revised slightly 
downwards from that presented in November’s Forecast. As 
previously noted, the recovery in consumer confidence and 
household spending (both in Scotland and in major, or new, 
export markets, particularly the rest of the UK) will drive the 
speed and duration of the recovery across the aggregate 
Service sector. One key area within the service sector will 
be the future performance of financial services (which 
together with Business Services is worth almost 25% of 
Scottish GVA). We forecast this sector sees a small return 
to positive growth in 2010, although this is also the year 
when significant job reorganisation is predicted for the 
aggregate financial services sector. We expect that we will 
see continuing changes in the size and scope of the 
financial services sector well into 2011, and the future shape 
of the sector will be considerably different than prior to 2008.  
 
Figure 4 estimates that declines in GVA in the Construction 
sector are largest again in 2009, and by as much as -8.2% 
in the Low growth scenario. Even in 2011 “Low growth” 
forecasts slightly negative GVA growth with positive growth 
recovering only in 2012. Vital for the recovery of this sector 
will be the pace by which consumer sentiment is restored in 
the housing market, as well as the demand for public sector 
investment projects. We noted above, the recent positive 
trends in construction activity have appeared over recent 
weeks, and the rate of house price declines has slowed. 
However, given the speed of the decline, and the massive 
uncertainties regarding the future shape of the sector as a 
whole, it is too soon to conclude whether the corner has 
been turned in the housing market. As we have previously 
stated, it is likely that the housing market will continue to see 
only slow growth in sales volumes over the next few years 
as slowly rising house prices restrict householders ability to 
move, either through lower than necessary equity holdings 
or through decreased availability of mortgage finance, 
particularly at previously available loan-to-value ratios. 
 
Employment 
Our forecasts for employment for each of the three 
scenarios are given in Table 4, along with the net aggregate 
employment change over the year. The employment figures 
relate to jobs, not FTEs, and are calibrated on the end-year 
(December) figures from the Employers’ Quarterly Survey 
Series, as given in Table 6.06 of the Economic and Labour 
Market Review, published by National Statistics. This gave 
total jobs in Scotland at the end of 2008 as 2,385,000. As 
we have previously forecast, we anticipate in our Central 
scenario that total job numbers in Scotland will fall in 
aggregate in during both 2009 and 2010, and see a 
recovery to positive job growth in 2011. 
 
In “Central”, employment is forecast to decline by 64,200 
jobs in 2009 and by 32,300 jobs in 2010. Total job numbers, 
and jobs in all of these broad industrial sectors, are forecast 
to then increase in 2011 and 2012. Total jobs in 2012 are 
forecast to be around 34,000 lower than the jobs total for 
2008 (a year when historic highs and lows respectively for 
the employment rate and unemployment rate were seen in 
Scotland). With the exception of Construction, the other 
broad sectors of the Scottish economy are forecast to see 
employment in 2012 higher than in 2009. 
 
In all scenarios, total job numbers in Scotland are forecast 
to decline in 2009 and 2010. “Low growth” sees around 
77,900 jobs being lost in 2009, and a further 57,000 in 2010. 
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In that scenario, total jobs lost between 2009 and 2012 are 
around 137,800, while in “High growth”, the recovery in 
2011 and 2012 sees job numbers recover towards their 
previously measured historical highs, and job numbers in 
2012 are around 17,193 higher than their level in 2008.  
Table 5 shows the net annual growth in jobs in each of the 
three scenarios, and shows how these have changed since 
our June 2009 forecast. The most recent Economic and 
Labour Market Review, to September 2009, has jobs in 
Scotland at 2,331,000, down roughly 56,000 on the situation 
one year earlier. We are forecasting in our central scenario 
that the rate of job decline seen through 2009 alleviates 
slightly in the last three months to December 2009, while in 
the “Low growth” scenario, this continues through 2009 and 
into 2010. 
 
Looking at the sectoral breakdown for these employment 
changes, in all scenarios the Services sector sees the 
largest decline in job numbers in both 2009 and 2010. 
Overall, the number of service sector jobs are forecast to fall 
by 23,800 in 2009 and a further decline of 19,000 in 2010. 
Financial services is forecast to be especially badly affected, 
losing almost 16,500 jobs between 2009 and 2010 (with the 
majority of these lost in 2010), but large job losses in 2009 
are also forecast in retail and wholesale. 
 
The Construction sector is forecast to lose around 18,500 
jobs in 2009, and a further 8,100 in 2010, and see a slow 
recovery through 2011 and 2012. As with the aggregate 
jobs total, the total jobs in construction in 2012 remain below 
levels of 2008. In the High growth scenario, lob losses in 
construction are smaller in 2009, and fall by almost 16,000 
while recovering to positive annual job growth of 1,800 and 
2,500 in 2011 and 2012. As mentioned in previous 
Commentaries, the construction sector has tended to see 
both quicker, and earlier, declines than the rest of the 
economy, and in previous upswings would be likely to see 
increased activity ahead of much of the economy. The 
sluggishness of a return to growth in the private housing 
sector may contribute to the growth of employment in the 
upswing being less than in following previous recessions in 
Scotland. 
 
Production jobs fall in 2009 by over 12,000 in the Central 
scenario, with a range from 11,000 to 13,000 in “High 
growth” and “Low growth” scenarios respectively. Within this 
broad sector, the most heavily hit sectors in 2009 will be 
those which rely upon export markets for the destination of 
their output, and so falls in employment are forecast in 
metals and non-metal products (down 1,300), electrical and 
electronic engineering (down 1,500) and mining and 
quarrying (down 1,000). Key to the response in the labour 
market will be the extent to which labour hoarding continues 
in the face of the recession. Reducing staff working time, 
and freezing pay increases have arguably contributed to the 
smaller than previously seen declines in employment for 
large changes in GVA. It remains to be seen however how 
long employees are retained before demand begins to 
recover, and employment growth can be seen. As with 
previous forecasts, it may be beyond 2012 before we see 
the job numbers in Scotland reaching the highs for 
employment seen before the recent recession. 
 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts for unemployment for 2009-2012 
in Scotland, as measured by the ILO definition as well as 
those claiming unemployment benefit, in Table 6. The 
preferred measure of unemployment is the ILO definition, as 
given by the Labour Force Survey. This measure is 
preferred as it reveals the extent of labour which is 
unemployed and available for work, rather than that portion 
of the available Scottish labour force which is currently in 
receipt of unemployment benefit. 
 
The forecasts for unemployment in 2009 and through 2010-
2012 have been revised upwards from forecasts published 
in the last Fraser Economic Commentary. Until the recent 
economic downturn, the Scottish labour market had been 
outperforming that of the UK when measured by the 
employment rate, and had seen historically high levels of 
employment and low levels of unemployment. Of crucial 
importance to the realised levels of unemployment will be 
the extent to which people who lose employment switch into 
the unemployed, or move into labour inactivity, i.e. are 
unemployed but not available for work.  The most recent 
data from February 2010 confirms that unemployment had 
risen and a rising unemployment level and rate would 
continue to be consistent with our “low growth” scenario. 
 
____________________ 
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Review of Scottish 
Business Surveys  
 
 
Overall 
Three themes have been evident in almost all recent 
surveys. Firstly, the Scottish economy was ‘clearly in a 
better position at the start of 2010 than it was twelve months 
ago’ (Scottish Chambers’ Business survey Q4 2009), ‘This 
final survey of 2009 (is) the most heartening of the year’ 
(Scottish Engineering Q4 2009). The Scottish Retail sales 
monitor reported ‘solid December shop sales’. Secondly, 
business sales and optimism trends in the fourth quarter 
were not as strong as the third quarter. The PMI (December 
data) noted the ‘Scottish economy recorded weaker rises in 
activity and new business in December’ compared to 
November. The Scottish Chambers’ Business survey noted 
‘fewer signs of a sustained recovery in manufacturing’, and 
the CBI Scottish Industrial trends noted ‘growth in total new 
orders was slower than in the previous quarter’, however in 
contrast, Scottish engineering reported better trends for the 
fourth quarter, although these were less evident for machine 
shops and metal manufacturing. In retail December like-for-
like sales growth was slightly weaker than in August – 
October, although disentangling the effects of the 
approaching end of the reduction in VAT and the 
exceptionally cold weather from overall trends in sales is 
problematic. Thirdly, ‘the Scottish economy is set to emerge 
from recession and return to weak growth during the first 
quarter of 2010’ (Lloyds TSB monitor). 
 
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey shows 
that the net rising trends in business confidence in 
manufacturing in the fourth quarter were less strong than in 
the three months to September. In construction net declining 
trends have remained largely unchanged for the past three 
quarters. In retail confidence, especially in the non multiple 
retail sector, remains negative, whilst in tourism confidence 
remains weak, but the fourth quarter trends were better than 
in Q4 2008 and 2007. Lloyds TSB noted that whilst the 
Scottish economy ‘has not yet returned to growth (it) is very 
close to the point of turnaround between decline and 
growth’. 
 
Pay pressures remained subdued for a further quarter. The 
percentages of respondents reporting pay increases in the 
fourth quarter to the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
ranged from 5% of construction to 19% of manufacturing, 
and average pay increases ranged from 1.5% in wholesale 
to 2.8% in manufacturing.  
 
Oil and Gas  
Data from the new Oil & Gas UK index (latest data 2009 Q3) 
suggested that overall business confidence had improved 
slightly in 2009, reflecting the rising price of oil and the 
easing access to finance. However, continued low 
wholesale gas prices were contributing to lower business 
confidence in the upstream sector and confidence remained 
weak amongst companies in the offshore oil and gas supply 
chain. The UKCS and the global oil sector is in a period of 
declining investment, re-assessment of projects and 
heightened concerns as to costs. However the recent 
announcement of tax changes may lead to both improved 
levels of business confidence and activity. The Aberdeen & 
Grampian Chamber of Commerce Oil & Gas Survey 
(published November 2009) noted that activity in the UKCS, 
at least the short term, has been reduced and business 
confidence remains frail, although the recent improvement 
in the oil price was welcomed. The proportion of contractors 
reporting working at or above optimum levels in the UKCS 
eased to the lowest levels recorded by the survey, although 
some improvement is anticipated for 2010.  
 
Skill shortages, a feature of previous years have eased, 
although this may well be due to a combination of reduced 
demand and a number of industry wide initiatives. 
Nevertheless, skill shortages and recruitment difficulties 
were again reported, although not to the same extent as in 
previous years. Average pay increase in 2009 eased to the 
levels reported in 2004, and the percentage reporting 
increasing pay was lower than in previous years. There was 
evidence of pay freezes and rate reductions, the ending of 
bonus payments and some reductions in terms and 
conditions. 
 
Production 
The latest Lloyds TSB Scotland Business Monitor (data to 
end November 2009) noted a stronger improvement in the 
production sector in contrast to the service sector which 
experienced a slight worsening of conditions in the three 
months to November 2009, with the trends in turnover much 
better than in either the second or third quarters of 2009. 
 
Manufacturing 
The Scottish Chambers, CBI Industrial Trends and Scottish 
Engineering surveys for the fourth quarter reported net 
rising trends in business confidence. However, whilst the 
Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted the rising trend 
in business confidence reported in the third quarter eased 
from a net balance of 32% in Q3 to 15% in Q4, Scottish 
Engineering and CBI Industrial Trends noted an 
improvement in business optimism between Q3 and Q4. 
 
Orders and Sales 
Scottish Chambers’ and CBI Scotland respondents reported 
that the outturn in total new orders and export orders was 
weaker than expected in the fourth quarter, as the actual 
trends in total, Scottish and rest of UK orders remained 
weak and weaker than in the third quarter. In contrast, 
Scottish Engineering reported rising levels of orders and the 
‘overall level of orders is the best since 2008 with large and 
medium companies reporting rising trends’. Whilst overall 
risingtrends are forecast for the first quarter of 2010 both 
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Table 1:  Business confidence (net trends) manufacturing, construction and tourism – Scottish Chambers’ Business 
Survey 
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Table 2:  Average capacity used in manufacturing and construction 
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Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chambers’ respondents 
are more cautious as to the level of improvement in orders. 
 
Once again a declining trend in the level of work in progress 
was reported by Scottish Chambers’ respondents, but the 
net decline is expected to end over the next twelve months, 
in contrast CBI Scotland respondents reported a slight 
improvement. Average capacity used by manufacturing 
respondents to the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
rose marginally by 0.3 percentage points to 71.9%, although 
61% (57% in Q3 and 71% in Q2) reported capacity used 
was below preferred levels. Pressures to raise prices due to 
raw material costs and other overheads have been reduced 
by  slowing costs inflation over the past year, but the 
effective devaluation of the pound has prompted concerns 
amongst both Scottish Chambers and CBI respondents of 
rising costs pressures and declining margins in 2010. 
 
Investment 
Scottish Chambers’ respondents noted an improvement in 
investment trends as 29% expect to increase investment 
and 5% anticipate increasing their leasing of equipment over 
the coming year, this positive trend was not evident 
amongst CBI Scotland or Scottish Engineering respondents.  
Scottish Chambers’ respondents noted cash flow trends 
improved compared to the past eight quarters. Respondents 
are more confident as to rising turnover during 2010, and 
the net trends are the most positive for eight quarters, in 
contrast expectations as to rising profitability eased. 
 
Employment 
Once again thirty-seven percent of Scottish Chambers’ 
Business Survey manufacturing firms attempted to recruit 
and there was some evidence in both Scottish Chambers 
and CBI Industrial Trends surveys, but not in the Scottish 
Engineering survey, of a temporary rise in employment, 
although this is not expected to continue through the first 
quarter of 2010. 
 
Construction 
 
Optimism 
Data from the latest Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
(Q4 2009) noted business confidence remained weak with 
only 15% reporting being more confident compared to the 
previous quarter. The net balance of optimism at -28% was 
less depressed than a year ago Q4 2008 when a net of -
78% was reported. Likewise the Scottish Construction 
Monitor (Q4 2009) described confidence as ‘flatlining’ and 
with many firms still ‘fearful’ about industry prospects in 
2010, with 80% of respondents reporting being less 
confident or no more confident about the outlook for 
business in 2010. In sharp contrast recent figures from the 
annual survey conducted by the Construction Skills 
Network, forecast that Scottish construction would return to 
growth of 2.8% in 2010, unlike other parts of the UK, due 
largely to the more important buoyant infrastructure sector in 
Scotland. 
Contracts   
Scottish Chambers’ data suggested the rate of decline in the 
net trend in new contracts eased marginally from -40% in 
the third quarter to -38% at the end of 2009.  The trends in 
orders from all sectors continued to decline although the 
rate of decline in domestic/house building orders eased.   
 
Expectations as to turnover trends into 2010 remain 
depressed, and are forecast to deteriorate further during 
2010.  A net of -48% (-31%, -37%, -64%, and -65% in the 
previous four quarters) anticipate declining turnover trends.  
A net of -60% (-44%, -59% -78% and -78% in the previous 
four quarters) anticipate declining profitability over the next 
twelve months and a net of 72% of construction firms 
anticipate declining tender margins during the same period.  
 
Average capacity declined by eight percentage points to 
66%, although bad weather conditions may be a factor here, 
and almost 50% expect a declining trend in the level of work 
in progress. 
 
Employment   
More than half of firms reduced total employment levels with 
only 13% reporting an increase in employment and 
recruitment again remained at very low levels. Only 5% of 
respondents reported increasing pay in the fourth quarter by 
an average of 2%. 
 
 
The service sector 
The Lloyds TSB survey noted that service businesses 
experienced a slight deterioration of conditions during the 
three months to the end of November 2009, and given the 
importance of this sector ‘may lead to Scottish recovery 
trailing that of the UK’. 
 
Retail Distribution 
 
Optimism 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted weak 
trends in business confidence in 2009 Q4, as the trend in 
business confidence declined from -8% in Q3 to -35% in Q4, 
reflecting the pressures independent and smaller retailers 
from weak demand, internet sales and the policies of the 
major multiple retailers. Nevertheless, despite the decline 
the overall trend was less depressed than Q4 2008 (-91%) 
and Q4 2007 (-42%).   
 
Sales    
The Scottish Retail Sales Monitor reported solid December 
shop sales, with like-for-like sales 1.4% higher than in 
December 2008, total sales were reported as 4.3% up on a 
year ago.  At least half of retailers reported and expect 
declining sales in the fourth and first quarters.  The rate of 
decline in actual and expected sales accelerated during 
quarter four although remained less depressed compared to 
Q4 2008.   
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Finance  
Both turnover and profitability are expected to decline 
further for a net of retailers over 2010, although the rate of 
decline is less than that anticipated by firms during quarter 
three 2009.  Two-thirds of retail respondents expect price 
increases during Q1 2010. 
 
Employment     
Most firms reported and expect no change to employment 
with fewer than 5% increasing or expecting to increase total 
employment levels. During the three months to the end of 
December the percentage of firms actively recruiting rose 
from 23% to 33%. Nine percent of firms increased wages by 
2.43%. 
 
Tourism 
 
Optimism 
According to the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey the 
overall level of business confidence became negative for a 
small net balance of responding firms although trends 
remained broadly unchanged from the previous quarter, and 
was significantly less depressed than in the same quarter of 
2008.   
 
Demand   
The net trend in total demand remained positive in quarter 
four. The rate of increase slowed although the overall trend 
was better than anticipated. Domestic demand continued to 
exhibit stronger trends than demand from abroad and 
business demand. Average occupancy declined from 72% 
to 62% (higher than in Q4 2008, but marginally lower than in 
Q4 2007).  The Scottish Occupancy study (data for 
November 2009) noted average room occupancy at 59%, 
the same as a year ago, and only one percentage point 
higher than the average reported for November 2005, 2006 
and 2007. Occupancy figures were highest in Edinburgh & 
the Lothians and Glasgow & Clyde regions and lowest in the 
Highlands and Islands  
 
Chamber of Commerce respondents report continuing to 
reduce room rates and the discounting of prices is more 
marked than during the same quarter a year ago and is set 
to continue in the first quarter.  
  
Business constraints   
An overall lack of demand remained the primary business 
constraint although hotels were also concerned with 
competition, exchange rates and poor transport 
infrastructure.  
 
Employment   
Changes in employment levels were reported by half of 
firms. Net declining trends in full time (-19%), part time (-
17%), seasonal   (-31%) and overtime working (-52%) were 
reported. 
 
 
Outlook   
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted 
manufacturing trends continue to offer the clearest signs of 
an emerging, but weak and fragile recovery; tourism 
continues to report better trends than a year ago. The CBI 
Industrial Trends Survey reported ‘In the industrial sector 
uncertainty about demand is still the factor most likely to 
limit capital spending.’ The trends for 2010 remain 
uncertain; the fragile recovery will have to contend with a 
possible weakening in consumer spending, the costs of a 
harsh winter, the re-imposition of VAT, and pressures on 
Government expenditure, as the latest Lloyds TSB survey 
noted ‘the recovery will be slow and tentative with many 
sectors delaying a recovery into growth until well into 2010’. 
Pressures on margins and likely pressures on raw material 
and other costs highlight the fragility of the recovery and 
both Scottish Chambers and Markit PMI Scotland 
highlighted rising input price inflation coupled with weak 
demand and the need to discount prices to sustain and 
improve order levels, although the CBI Industrial Trends 
survey was more optimistic. The labour market continues to 
remain weak with few signs of an improvement.   
 
 
Cliff Lockyer /Eleanor Malloy 
February 2010 
 
____________________ 
 
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported 
by a number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industries Scottish 
Industrial Trends Survey for the fourth quarter of 2009; 
2. Lloyds TSB Business Monitor 48 for the quarters 
September – November 2009 and expectations to 
February 2010; 
3. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Reviews for the fourth 
quarter of 2009;  
4. The Markit Economics Regional Monthly Purchasing 
Managers’ Index for November and December 2009; 
5. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s Monthly Scottish 
Retail Sales Monitor for November and December 
2009; 
6. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly 
Business Survey, reports for the fourth quarter of 2009;  
7. Oil & Gas UK quarterly Index quarter 3 2009; 
8. Visit Scotland Occupancy Survey November 2009; 
9. The Scottish Construction Monitor quarter 4 2009;  
10. The Construction Skills Network Annual Survey 2009. 
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Overview of the  
labour market 
 
 
 
Inevitably current interest in the Scottish labour market 
continues to focus on the trends and patterns in the 
unemployment figures and again in this issue we note 
recent changes in Scottish labour market trends. However, 
realisation that unemployment levels have not risen to 
anticipated levels or as sharply as in previous recessions 
prompts a reconsideration of the how the ‘flexible’ labour 
market has adjusted in the recession. 
 
The CBI (Employment Trends in 2009) noted most firms 
have either made or are planning changes to working 
patterns most notably more flexible working, reducing 
overtime, making less use of agency workers and cutting 
shifts and, to a lesser extent implementing short term 
working  and increased use of fixed term contracts. The 
CIPD/KPMG Labour Market Outlook survey (2009) reported 
some 17% had implemented reduced hours programmes 
and were planning to ask staff to work shorter hours in 
2010. Both the CBI and CIPD surveys in 2009 noted a 
reduction in spend on training in 2009. The CBI reported 
approximately 44% of respondents were reducing their 
spend on training; whilst the CIPD noted median spend on 
training per employee declined from £300 in 2008 to £220 in 
2009. 
 
However, the OECD (Employment Outlook) has been more 
cautious as to the benefits of flexible employment in terms 
of whether employees are any better prepared to withstand 
a period of weak labour demand than in previous 
recessions. As Myers (2009) comments ‘the apparent 
limited adjustment in labour input during the latter stages of 
2008 was surprising given ....assumptions that the UK’s 
labour market had increased in flexibility over the past two 
decades’, although Myers notes later evidence suggests 
labour input adjustment gathered pace by the middle of 
2009 (Myers, M. 2009. The impact of the economic 
downturn on productivity growth. Economic & Labour Market 
Review vol.3 no. 6 June 2009). 
 
Labour Force survey evidence, for the UK, indicates that 
average hours worked for full time employees fell from an 
average of 37.1 (Sept-Nov 2007) to 36.5 hours (Jun-August 
2009) and average hours for part-time employees declined 
from an average of 15.7 (Sept-Nov 2008) to 15.3 hours 
(June-August 2009). 
 
The CBI (Employment Trends in 2009) noted that more than 
half of respondents planned a pay freeze in their next 
review; the CIPD (Labour Market Outlook 2009) noted some 
16% planned to implement a pay freeze in the three months 
to December 2009. Data from the Monthly Wages and 
Salaries Survey for the UK reported that earnings growth for 
the whole economy for the year to April 2008 was 3.9%, this 
declined to 3.4% per annum in January 2009 and reached a 
low of 1.8% per annum in September 2009 (Jenkins, J. & 
Leaker, D. The Labour market across the UK in the current 
recession. Economic & Labour Market Review. Vol. 4 no. 1 
Jan 2010). Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business 
Survey (see the Review of Surveys Section) noted that both 
the percentages increasing pay and average pay increases 
were at historic low levels in 2009. 
 
The increasing recognition of the likelihood of widespread 
job losses in the public sector prompts a consideration of 
the trends in public sector employment; one estimate is that 
Local Government faces having to lose some 3,000 jobs, 
initially by early retirement and other voluntary schemes, in 
the next financial year (Sunday Herald 31.01.2010), 
although this figure is likely to rise through 2010. 
 
The latest available data, Q3 2009, indicates 573,800 
employed in the Scottish public sector (excluding the those 
employed by RBS and Lloyds who have been reclassified 
as UK wide public corporations), of which 44.6% were 
employed in local government (excluding police and fire 
services) and 26.5% in the NHS. The numbers employed 
(full time equivalents) in Scottish local authorities (Q3 2009) 
are as follows: 56,000 teachers (62,600 headcount), 36,400 
other education staff (50,500 headcount); 43,600 in social 
work (54,500 headcount); 23,800 in police and related 
services (24,700 headcount); 5,700 in fire services (5,800 
headcount) and 85,500 other staff (106,500 headcount).  
 
Table 1: Total public sector employment in Scotland 
(headcount Q3 2009) 
 
 Headcount 
% 
Total Local Government (ex Police & fire 44.6% 
NHS 26.5% 
Public Sector Financial Institutions 6.3% 
UK Government Departments 5.4% 
Police and Related Services 4.0% 
UK wide public bodies 4.0% 
Devolved public bodies 3.3% 
Scottish Government Core, Agencies and 
Non Ministerial Departments 
 
2.9% 
Armed Forces 1.9% 
Fire and Related Services 1.0% 
Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body 0.1% 
 
 
 
A recent CRESC Working Paper (Centre for Research on 
socio-Cultural Change, Working Paper No. 75, December 
2009. The Open University) argues that ‘the boundaries 
between public and private (sector) employment are blurred’ 
(CRECS December 2009:17). Recently, as the Public 
Sector Employment in Scotland: Statistics for 3rd Quarter 
2009 notes, staff have been transferred from Local 
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Table 2:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, October – December 2009 
 
  
October- 
December 2009  Scotland 
Change on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change 
on quarter 
Change 
on year 
Employment* 
 
Level (000s) 2,492 -8 -41 28,905  -12 -428 
Rate (%) 73.5 -0.4 -1.8 72.4 -0.1 -1.7 
        
Unemployment** Level (000s)          206  10 65 2,457  -3 448 Rate (%) 7.6 0.4 2.4 7.8 0.0 1.4 
        
Activity* Level (000s)       2,697  2 24 31,363  -15 20 Rate (%) 79.8 -0.1 0.1 78.7 -0.2 -0.5 
        
Inactivity*** Level (000s)        652  3 -3 8,077 72 241 Rate (%) 20.2 0.1 -0.1       21.3  0.2 0.5 
 
 
Source: Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, February 2010  
 
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Employee jobs by industry, Scotland, September 2009 
 
All jobs 
(seasonall
y adjusted) 
All 
jobs 
Agriculture
, Forestry 
and 
Fishing 
Mining 
Energy 
and Water 
Supplies 
Industries 
Man-
ufacturing 
Industries Construction 
Distribution 
etc, transport 
etc, finance 
and business 
services 
Education, 
health, 
public 
admin and 
other 
services 
SIC 2003 
Section  A-O A,B C,E D F H-K L-O 
Sep 05 2,373 2,373 32 37 232 129 1,102 842 
Mar 06 2,376 2,368 31 36 224 135 1,094 848 
Sep 06 2,361 2,360 33 38 224 138 1,085 841 
Mar 07 2,380 2,371 34 41 222 145 1,082 847 
Sep 07 2,389 2,389 33 43 222 139 1,108 844 
Dec 07 2,391 2,400 25 42 220 139 1,127 847 
Mar 08 2,392 2,382 28 42 218 137 1,109 849 
Jun 08  2,396 2,396 35 42 216 136 1,114 853 
Sep 08 2,389 2,387 35 41 216 138 1,104 852 
Dec 08 2,374 2,385 33 41 212 140 1,103 856 
Mar 09 2,362 2,354 37 40 206 139 1,075 858 
Jun 09 2,340 2,339 29 41 203 130 1,075 861 
Sep 09 2,332 2,331 27 40 203 127 1,070 864 
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Government employment to a privately contracted 
organisation or charity, yet continue to perform the same 
roles within Local Government. There is more evidence of 
councils planning efficiency savings/cuts affecting a range of 
services currently provided/supported by the voluntary 
sector. Currently Scottish Voluntary Sector employees 
approximately 129,000 (83,500 FTEs) and it is estimated 
that 47% of income is spend on salaries. 
 
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market1 between 
Scotland and the United Kingdom in the quarter October – 
December 2009 are summarised in Table 2. Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data show that in the quarter to December 
2009 the level of employment in Scotland fell by 8 thousand, 
to 2,492 thousand. Over the year to December 2009, 
employment in Scotland fell by 41 thousand. For the same 
period, UK employment fell by 428 thousand. The Scottish 
employment rate – those in employment as a percentage of 
the working age population – was 73.5 per cent, down 1.8 
per cent compared to one year earlier.  For the same period 
the UK employment rate was 72.4 per cent, down 1.7 per 
cent compared to one year earlier. 
 
In considering employment, activity and unemployment 
rates it is important to remember the bases and 
relationships of these figures.  LFS data is provided for: (1) 
all aged 16 and over and (2) for all aged 59/64. The first 
measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to higher numbers in 
employment, in the total economically active and 
economically inactive – but reduces the economic activity 
rates and unemployment rates, but at the same time 
increases the economically inactive rate. Conversely the 
second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads to lower 
numbers economically active, in employment and 
economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically 
active, employment and unemployment rates but lower 
economically inactive rates. 
 
The relationships between employment, unemployment, 
totally economically active and inactive are important in 
appreciating changing levels of employment and 
unemployment, and changes in the employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in the activity 
rates.  If people leave employment and become 
unemployed (but are still economically active) the 
unemployment rate increases, but the economically active 
rate remains unchanged. However, if people leave 
employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be 
an emerging pattern, they are categorised as economically 
inactive, as such the unemployment rate remains 
unchanged whilst the activity and inactivity rates change. 
 
Table 2 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment rose 
significantly to 206 thousand, between October - December 
2009, or by 65 thousand over the year2. The ILO 
unemployment rate rose in the three months to December 
2009 and now stands at 7.6 per cent. This represents a 0.4 
per cent rise over the last quarter and a 2.4 per cent rise 
relative to the same period a year earlier. The comparable 
ILO unemployment rate for the UK stands at 7.8 per cent, 
and is up 0.0 per cent over the most recent quarter, and up 
1.4 per cent over the year.  
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those currently 
in employment (i.e. self-employed, government employed, 
unpaid family workers and those on training programmes). 
Table 2 shows that the level of the economically active rose 
by 0.4 per cent between October - December 2009. There 
were 2,697 thousand economically active people in 
Scotland during October – December 2009. This comprised 
2,4921 thousand in employment and 206 thousand ILO 
unemployed. The level for those of working age but 
economically inactive rose in the last quarter, up 0.1 per 
cent on the previous quarter to 652 thousand people. This 
indicates a decrease of -0.1 per cent in the number of 
people of working age economically inactive over the last 
year.  
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for Jobseekers 
allowance claimants in Scotland stood at 136.2 thousand in 
December 2009, up 36.7 thousand or 36.9% over the year. 
The claimant count rate in December 2009 stood at 4.9 per 
cent. This is up 1.3 per cent over the year. The UK claimant 
count rate in December 2009 was 5.0 per cent, but level 
over the year. 
 
Unemployment data at the Scottish constituency level for 
December 2009 is available in a SPICe Briefing, with more 
recent figures available 17th February 2010.  
  
The most recent figures for the number of employee jobs by 
industrial activity are detailed in Table 3. Employee job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
September 2009 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,332 
thousand. The number of jobs in the manufacturing industry 
has levelled out and remains at 203 thousand, and down 13 
thousand against the same quarter one year earlier. The 
number of jobs in the service industry fell by 5,000 over the 
last quarter to 1,070 thousand, and there are now 34 
thousand fewer jobs in the service industry than the same 
period ending a year earlier.  
 
Table 4 provides some limited indications of the experience 
of unemployment in terms of claimant count by age and 
duration. Over the year the claimant count has risen by 
33.0% (for the 18 – 24 age group by 31.0%, 25 – 49 age 
group by 33.1% and for the 50+ by 34.0%). The latest 
figures suggest that 18,600 have been claiming benefit for 
more than a year, up 10,000 over the year (up 116.7%), 
7,300 18 – 24 year olds have now been claiming benefit for 
over 6 months and up to 12 months.  
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 4:  Claimant count by age and duration (computerised claims only) Numbers and percentage change over year to 
January 2010 
 
 
 All computerised 
claims 
Up to 6 
months 
Over 6 and up to 12 
months  
All over 12 
months 
     
All 16+ numbers 144,900 97,500 28,000 18,600 
All 16+ % change over year 33.0 15.6 77.4 116.7 
     
All 18 – 24 change in numbers (%) 
over year 
9,700 (31.0%) 4,600 (16.9% 3,900 (114.6%) 1,100 
(301.3%) 
All 25- 49 change in numbers (%) 
over year 
19,600 (33.1%) 6,500 (14.9%) 6,500 (68.4%) 5,800 
All 50 and over change in numbers 
(%) over year 
5,600 (34.0%) 1,700 (14.1%) 1,800 (63.3%) 2,200 
(108.8%) 
 
 
 
 
Outlook  
In the year to December 2009 the total in employment fell by 
41,000 and unemployment rose by 65,000 to 206,000 but 
the numbers economically inactive fell by 3,000 over the 
year. In 2010 and 2011 the scale of job losses in finance 
and the public sector will become be clearer.  A new 
government committed to a more rapid reduction in the 
fiscal deficit might lead to unemployment rising to higher 
than expected levels  as might the 1% increase in 
employers’ national insurance contributions scheduled for 
April 2011. 
 
Pay restraint policies seem inevitable, but at this stage it is 
uncertain as to how widely such restraint will be accepted in 
the new climate of much more awareness as to pay and 
remuneration packages for senior executives in both the 
public and private sectors. As the recent report of the 
National Equality Panel notes ‘Inequalities in earnings and 
income are high in Britain, both compared with other 
industrialised countries, and compared to thirty years ago.’ 
(An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK, Government 
Equalities Office. 2010). The report noted ‘Income inequality 
in Britain has remained much higher than in the 1960s and 
1970s; and on some measures it is the highest in last 50 
years’. Such inequalities may well hinder efforts to introduce 
a period of pay restraint. 
 
The employment landscape will change over the next few 
years, employment levels in the public sector are likely to 
decline, but the demand for services will remain high. More 
people will seek to work past retirement age as pension 
arrangements are perceived to be inadequate, but this trend 
will impact on measures to reduce youth unemployment.  
Differing patterns of migration will impact on the longer term 
Scottish problem, that of an aging workforce.    
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________  
 
Endnotes:  
1The Census 2001-consistent population figures at local authority 
level were released in February 2003. This has allowed the 
production of interim regional LFS estimates. The population data 
only cover the periods up to mid-2001. The data presented here are 
taken mainly from Labour Market Statistics, May 2008 and are 
consistent with the updated LFS data available on NOMIS from 
Summer 2004. Labour Market Statistics continue to report data for 
Scotland at the quarterly level, so this will continue to form the basis 
of our analysis of movements in the labour market between 
quarters.  
 
2The Labour Force Survey definition of ILO unemployment takes 
precedence over the claimant count measure. ILO unemployment is 
much less sensitive to changes in the regulations governing 
unemployment benefit, and conforms to a widely accepted standard 
to allow for more meaningful cross-country comparisons.  
 
Cliff Lockyer 
February 2010 
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Introduction 
The Commission on Scottish Devolution chaired by Sir 
Kenneth Calman delivered its report in June 2009. Among 
its recommendations on transfers of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament were a set of income tax proposals. 
 
Following the publication of the Calman report (2009), we 
identified certain technical problems relating to these tax 
proposals. These were the subject of an open letter we sent 
to the Calman Commission in July 2009. This note begins 
with a review of the position on these technical problems, in 
the light of the publication of the Westminster Government’s 
White Paper on Calman in November, (Cm 7738). Our 
conclusion is that, far from addressing the technical 
problems we had identified, the proposals in the White 
Paper in fact make one of these problems significantly 
worse. We also consider other significant issues relating to 
the potential effect of the proposed tax-sharing 
arrangements on the relations between the Scottish and 
Westminster governments, and to the potential utility of the 
new tax raising powers of the Scottish government as an 
instrument of fiscal policy. We conclude that both the 
original Calman report, and the White Paper, have failed to 
address these issues adequately.  
 
Problems identified in original Calman 
proposals 
The basic proposal on income tax in the Calman report can 
be summarised as follows. All income tax rates in Scotland 
would be reduced by 10p. At the same time, the Block Grant 
coming to the Scottish government would suffer a once and 
for all reduction equal to the amount which the 10p tax cut 
had cost the Whitehall Exchequer. The Scottish government 
would then be able to set its own rate of income tax, which 
would be levied as an addition to the reduced UK rate in 
Scotland. Hence, if the Scottish government set its rate at 
10p, it would, at least initially, return its revenues to their 
original value. Note that the determination of the income tax 
bands themselves would remain under the control of 
Westminster. 
 
What was the expected result of this change? In essence, 
the Commission was seeking to achieve greater financial 
accountability for the Scottish Parliament, while at the same 
time trying to strengthen the UK union. Under its proposal, 
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the Scottish government would have to make a definite 
decision about what rate of income tax it would set. For the 
first time, the Scottish parliament would be accountable not 
only for how it spent its money but also for how it raised a 
major part of the money it wanted to spend. In criticising the 
existing Block Grant method of funding the Scottish 
Parliament, the Commission noted that the Parliament “has 
no fiscal powers that can be used as policy instruments and 
it does not have a direct financial stake in the performance 
of the Scottish economy”: (Calman report, para. 3.87). We 
can reasonably assume that the Commission intended its 
proposal to remedy these defects. 
 
In the open letter which we sent to the Calman commission 
in July 2009, we identified two technical problems with these 
proposals.1   The first of these related to the possibility that 
there could be an undesirable outcome from the proposed 
new tax system in that, under certain circumstances, the 
income tax revenues coming to the Scottish government 
might move in a different direction to overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland. (As shorthand, we describe 
this situation as the possibility of an anomalous movement 
in tax revenues). The second technical problem related to 
the adverse effects which fiscal drag was likely to have, if 
the Calman proposals were implemented. We now consider 
these two problems in more detail. 
 
Possible anomalous movements in tax revenues 
Let us assume a Scottish government is operating under the 
income tax system as originally proposed by Calman. If the 
Scottish government sets the Scottish rate of income tax as 
x pence in the £, then it will receive a proportion 
10)(x
x

 of 
the basic rate income tax revenues collected in Scotland, 
(with corresponding proportions 
30)(x
x

 and 
0)4(x
x

 for the 
intermediate and highest tax bands respectively). Since  
10)(x
x

 is an increasing function of x, the Scottish 
government will receive an increasing proportion of the 
overall basic rate revenues raised in Scotland, as it 
increases its tax rate x, ( and similarly for the other tax 
bands). It will receive a decreasing proportion as it reduces 
x.  
 
A number of different outcomes are possible. Suppose that 
the Scottish government reduces the Scottish rate of tax, 
and at the same time, overall income tax revenues in 
Scotland decrease. Then the Scottish government will be 
receiving a decreasing proportion of a decreasing total – so 
that the revenues coming to the Scottish government will 
clearly be reducing. In this case, the overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland, and those coming to the 
Scottish government, are moving in the same direction.  
 
Suppose, however, that when the Scottish government 
decreases the Scottish rate of tax, overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland increase. Then the Scottish 
government will be getting a decreasing fraction of an 
increasing total. In these circumstances, it is not possible to 
say without further information whether the tax revenues 
coming to the Scottish government will be increasing or 
decreasing. But in principle, it is clear that, if the increase in 
overall tax revenues is not particularly large, then the 
amount of revenue coming to the Scottish government might 
decrease. That is, total income tax revenues, and the 
income tax revenues coming to the Scottish government, 
could move in different directions.  
 
Annex 1 examines the algebra surrounding this situation in 
more detail. It identifies precisely when the anomalous effect 
of the Scottish government’s income tax revenues moving in 
a different direction to overall income tax revenues collected 
in Scotland will occur. The relevant conditions derived in 
Annex 1 are summarised here:  
 
Within the basic rate band of income tax: if the effect of a 
unit decrease in the income tax rate in Scotland is to 
increase the overall income tax revenues from the basic 
rate, but by less than 5%, then the revenue coming to the 
Scottish government from the basic rate band will decrease. 
 
Within the higher rate bands: if the effect of a unit 
decrease in the income tax rate in Scotland is to increase 
total revenues, but by less than 7.5% for the 40% band, or 
8% for the 50% band, then the revenue coming to the 
Scottish government from the relevant band will decrease. 
 
Two questions therefore become very relevant: 
 
a) Would it matter if a Scottish government found 
itself operating in a position where this anomaly 
held? 
 
b) How likely is it that the conditions for this anomaly 
to hold will actually be met? 
 
As regards the first question, we argue that it would matter a 
great deal if a Scottish government found itself in this 
position. Suppose that total income tax revenues could be 
increased by a reduction in the Scottish rate of tax, probably 
supported by other stimulatory measures. If, however, the 
tax elasticities were such that the anomaly held, then the 
Scottish government would have to reconcile itself to 
suffering a permanent reduction in its own revenues if it 
wanted to stimulate the Scottish economy by lowering taxes 
– even though the Whitehall exchequer would benefit from 
increased revenues. More realistically, at a time of stringent 
pressure on its finances, a Scottish government operating 
under these conditions could well find itself forced to raise 
its tax rates to boost its own revenues – at the expense of 
deflating the Scottish economy, and also at the expense of 
the Whitehall exchequer. So if the anomalous conditions 
actually held, the Scottish government could be forced into 
actions which were perverse – both from the point of view of 
the Scottish economy, and of the Whitehall exchequer. By 
contrast, if the tax elasticities were exactly the same, but the 
Scottish government’s income tax revenues always moved 
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in the same direction as total income tax revenues raised in 
Scotland, then a Scottish government could lower its tax 
rate - to the benefit of the Scottish economy, its own 
revenues, and the UK exchequer. 
 
This then makes the second question very important. Are 
the conditions of the Calman anomaly so unlikely that the 
possibility of their occurring can be discounted: or is there a 
significant chance that these conditions could actually hold? 
We do not have a definitive answer to this question, but the 
following points are relevant.  
 
a) There is little or no experience of this particular situation. 
What is relevant is what happens to tax revenues in 
Scotland, when the income tax rate in Scotland is varied, 
with the tax rate in the rest of the UK remaining fixed. 
This is a situation which has never been met with before 
in the UK. 
 
b) In practice, a Scottish government would probably 
deploy a package of measures, as well as a cut in the 
Scottish rate of income tax, if it were trying to stimulate 
the economy. Such measures might include, for 
example, cuts in non-domestic rates, or in water prices. 
So the relevant question is not what happens to total 
income tax revenues in Scotland when tax rates are 
varied while everything else is held constant, (which is 
the conventional Laffer curve), but what the response 
would be to an overall stimulus package.  
 
c)   Without attempting an overall literature review, it is 
relevant to note one piece of evidence. This is the paper 
by Gagné, Nadeau, and Vaillancourt, (2000), which 
suggests that in Canada the response to income tax rate 
changes at the provincial level could well have a 
negative elasticity in the higher rate tax bands.  
 
Overall, the view we take is that a stimulus package for the 
Scottish economy, including a reduction in income tax rates 
in Scotland relative to England, might boost the Scottish 
economy sufficiently to produce a modest increase in total 
income tax revenues in Scotland. Given this, we argue that 
a precautionary principle should be adopted in designing 
any new taxation system: so that whatever income tax 
arrangements are eventually implemented for the devolved 
Scottish government, there should be no possibility of total 
income tax revenues, and the income tax revenues coming 
to the Scottish government, moving in opposite directions. 
The original Calman proposals fail this test. We set out later, 
for interest, a modification of the Calman proposals which 
would avoid the problem. 
 
Effects of fiscal drag 
If the Scottish government sets a tax rate of around 10p, 
then it will receive approximately 50%, 25%, and 20%, 
respectively of the total tax revenues raised in Scotland from 
the basic rate, intermediate, and highest rate bands. These 
widely differing proportions would, in practice, give rise to 
the following two problems:  
a)  Because of the effects of fiscal drag, there is likely to be 
a consistent shift through time in the proportion of overall 
tax revenues raised from the different bands. Combined 
with the differing proportions of revenues coming to the 
Scottish government within each band, this will then lead 
to a consistent trend in the tax revenues going to the 
Scottish government, over and above any trend in 
overall tax revenues. Since the effect of fiscal drag is 
usually to increase the proportion of tax raised at the 
higher bands, (from which the Scottish government 
receives a smaller proportion of the revenues), the 
expected outcome is that there would be a declining 
trend in the overall proportion of tax revenues in 
Scotland actually coming to the Scottish government.  
 
b)   Secondly, whenever the UK government, which is in 
charge of the UK income tax system, changed the tax 
thresholds or the structure of the system, there would be 
a shift in the relative amounts of tax collected in the 
different bands – and hence, a change in the amount of 
tax allocated to the Scottish government. At the very 
least, this would open the Scottish government to the 
danger of unpredictable and unplanned changes in its 
tax revenues. At its worst, this situation could be 
manipulated deliberately by a UK government, if it 
wished to trim the resources going to the Scottish 
government. Either way, the Scottish government would 
be placed in an insupportable position.  
 
 
A modification to the Calman proposals 
which would avoid the above problems 
In our open letter, we derived conditions which a tax sharing 
system of the Calman type would have to satisfy, in order to 
ensure that both of the difficulties identified in the preceding 
section were avoided. The argument is as follows. 
 
Annex 2 derives the conditions under which, for a general 
class of tax sharing systems, total tax revenues, and the 
revenue going to the Scottish government, will always move 
in the same direction. In words, the key requirement is that, 
in any tax band, if overall tax revenues drop as the Scottish 
tax rate increases, then the percentage increase in the 
share of tax revenues going to the Scottish government 
should be smaller than the percentage decrease in overall 
tax revenues. But since the potential decrease in tax 
revenues (if any) resulting from an increase in the Scottish 
tax rate is unknown, the only way that it can be guaranteed 
that the condition will always be met is if the percentage 
increase in the share of tax revenues going to the Scottish 
government is zero: that is, within each tax band, if the tax 
sharing system gives the Scottish government a fixed share 
of the tax revenues raised in Scotland in that band.  
 
The circumstances under which the fiscal drag problem will 
be avoided are that the percentage share of the tax 
revenues from each tax band going to the Scottish 
government must be the same.  
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The implication is that, if both the problem of anomalous 
revenue movements, and the problems associated with 
fiscal drag, are to be avoided, then the Scottish government 
should receive a fixed percentage share of the overall 
income tax revenues raised in Scotland. 
 
Hence a tax sharing system which would always avoid both 
problems would involve the Scottish government setting its 
own rate of tax, (as proposed by Calman), but the Scottish 
government then receiving the same, fixed, percentage 
share of overall income tax revenues collected in Scotland. 
 
Note that, while this modification of the Calman proposals 
would solve the identified technical problems, we are not 
ourselves advocating that this modification should be 
implemented, for the following reason. Under the modified 
Calman system, a decision by the Scottish government to 
change the Scottish rate of income tax would clearly have a 
direct impact on the revenues received by the UK 
government: and conversely, any change in tax rate by the 
UK government would have a direct impact on the revenues 
of the Scottish government. Successful operation of this 
system would thus require that the UK and devolved 
governments were willing to operate in a collegiate manner 
– being appreciative of, and respecting, the impact that their 
own actions will have on the revenues of the other parties. 
The implication is that a successful tax sharing system 
would have to involve a more federal way of working than is 
the current practice in the UK. It would be a mistake to 
introduce such a system unless all the potential 
ramifications of this had been clearly thought through in 
advance. (Note that the Calman proposals themselves 
would have an effect on UK tax revenue, but this would be a 
second order, rather than a first order effect.) 
 
The White Paper on Calman of 25th 
November 
On 25th November 2009, the UK government published its 
White Paper with its proposals for taking forward the 
Calman recommendations. As regards income tax, the 
White Paper proposed that the Calman recommendations 
should be implemented virtually in their original form. There 
is, however, one important exception, which we discuss in 
this section. This relates to the transitional arrangements 
proposed in the White Paper. These would in fact have a 
very significant effect on the operation of the tax sharing 
system – and in a way which makes the potential for 
anomalous revenue movement much worse. It is fair to say 
that the implications of the White Paper’s transitional 
arrangements seem to have escaped general comment. 
 
The transitional arrangements are described in paragraphs 
4.18 and 4.19 of the White Paper. It is stated there that the 
Calman proposals on income tax will need to be phased in 
carefully “at a time of major fiscal adjustment and economic 
uncertainty”. During the phasing in period, the adjustment to 
the Block Grant will not be done on a one off basis, but will 
be calculated afresh for each new Public Expenditure 
spending review – that is, every three years. The UK 
government would forecast tax receipts from Scottish  
taxpayers for the three years of each spending review, and 
a sum equivalent to a 10p reduction in the rate of income 
tax would then be subtracted from the Scottish Block Grant 
for each of these years.  
 
The White Paper puts no specific time limit on the operation 
of these transitional arrangements, but says that there 
would be a move towards the full model proposed by 
Calman as soon as economic and fiscal circumstances 
permitted. 
 
Given that current economic uncertainties look set to persist 
for the foreseeable future, it seems likely that the transitional 
arrangements would operate for a significant length of time.  
 
Suppose that the transitional arrangements are in operation, 
and that a Scottish government reduces the Scottish rate of 
income tax below 10p to, say, 8p. When the Westminster 
government next comes to adjust the Scottish Block grant, it 
will subtract from the original Scottish Block grant an 
amount equal to the estimated yield of a 10p income tax 
rate in Scotland. Assuming the Westminster government is 
accurate in its estimate, this will be a larger amount than 
what the Scottish government gets back from the lower 
Scottish tax rate it has set. In other words, under the 
arrangements set out in the White Paper, if the Scottish 
government reduces its tax rate below 10p, it will always 
suffer financially. This would happen even if the reduction in 
the Scottish tax rate was part of a successful package to 
stimulate the Scottish economy, as a result of which overall 
income tax revenues in Scotland actually went up. 
 
Conversely, if the Scottish government raises the Scottish 
income tax rate above 10p, then the Scottish government 
will always benefit financially – even if the effect of the tax 
rise had been to damage the economy, leading to a 
reduction in overall income tax revenues collected in 
Scotland.  
 
In fact, a stronger result can be proved about the effect of 
the transitional arrangements. It is not just the case that a 
Scottish government is worse off by cutting its tax rate 
below 10p relative to what it would receive if it set a 10p 
rate: and vice versa if it set a rate above 10p. The stronger 
result also holds that, for all tax rates which are likely to be 
feasible in practice, the slope of the curve relating the 
Scottish government’s revenues to the Scottish rate of 
income tax is positive. This result is proved in Annex 3. It 
can be seen from the Annex that the conditions under which 
this result holds are so general as to justify our assertion 
that the result holds for all feasible tax rates. 
 
What this result means is that, under the transitional 
arrangements, the Scottish government will always face 
what is in effect an upward sloping Laffer curve, for any 
feasible tax rate it might consider setting. The first technical 
problem we identified with the original Calman proposals 
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has now actually become much worse. Previously, if the 
elasticity of overall income tax revenues was sufficiently 
negative there was still a chance that the elasticity of 
Scottish government revenues might be negative too. Under 
the Calman transitional arrangements, there is no such 
chance.  
 
It is unclear what effect the transitional arrangements have 
on the second technical problem we identified, relating to 
fiscal drag. Under one scenario, however, the effect can be 
predicted. Suppose that both the unadjusted Block Grant, 
and total income tax revenues collected in Scotland, were 
rising in line with inflation. Suppose also that the yield of a 
10p tax rate in Scotland represents a decreasing proportion 
of total tax revenues, because of fiscal drag. Then a 
Scottish government which set a 10p tax rate in the absence 
of the transitional arrangements would see its revenues 
rising more slowly than inflation: whereas with the 
transitional arrangements in place, its revenues would rise 
in line with inflation. Under this scenario, therefore, the 
transitional arrangements do indeed overcome one of the 
major problems associated with fiscal drag. However, this 
particular scenario is relatively unlikely. Under other, more 
complicated scenarios, it is not clear what the effect of the 
interaction of fiscal drag and the transitional arrangements 
would be. 
 
Important issues not addressed in either the 
Calman Report or the White Paper 
In the section above where we derived a modification to the 
Calman proposals which would avoid the identified technical 
problems, we expressed caution about implementing this 
change, because of the implications it would have for the 
relations between the Scottish and Westminster 
governments. This issue, however, is not just confined to 
this particular modification of Calman. Any system of tax 
sharing, including the original Calman proposals 
themselves, is going to have an effect on the relationship, 
and mode of working, between the different layers of 
government involved. The Calman report did indeed 
recommend that the liaison arrangements between the 
Westminster and Scottish governments would have to be 
strengthened, in the light of their proposals on tax sharing. 
But they did not analyse in detail the specific tensions and 
pressures which the new system would be subject to: hence 
it is not clear whether Calman’s specific proposals on 
improving liaison would be able to cope.  
 
Among important questions which need to be addressed are 
the following. Would implementation of the original Calman 
proposals, (leaving aside their technical flaws), result in 
fundamental shifts in the relations between the different 
parties which would institute a dynamic for further change? 
Is it possible to implement a tax sharing system which is 
technically acceptable, without moving to something akin to 
a federal system? These are fundamental questions, which 
the Calman report, and the White Paper, signally failed to 
address.  
 
Another important set of questions which were similarly 
neglected in both the Report and the White Paper relates to 
how effective the proposed tax varying powers would be as 
a tool which the Scottish government could use in economic 
management, and fiscal policy. As we have already noted, 
the lack of such tools was one of Calman’s criticisms of the 
existing block grant arrangements: and it is reasonable to 
assume that the Calman Commission hoped that their 
proposals would remedy this lack. Despite this, neither the 
report nor the White Paper pay any attention to examining 
the question of whether their proposed tax varying powers 
would constitute an effective economic management tool for 
the Scottish government. In fact, our analysis above 
suggests that there is a grave risk that the proposed powers 
would have perverse effects which could gravely damage 
the Scottish economy – this being particularly the case for 
the White Paper transitional arrangements. The implication 
is that the proposed powers would be worse than useless as 
tools of economic management. We find it very surprising 
that Calman, having identified the need for fiscal powers 
that could be used as policy instruments, and for the 
Scottish government to have a direct financial stake in the 
performance of the Scottish economy, paid no attention to 
the question of whether the proposed changes actually 
fulfilled these requirements. If the Calman Commission had 
considered this topic, it seems likely that they would have 
discovered for themselves the anomalous effects, and likely 
adverse implications for the Scottish economy, which are 
implicit in their proposals. 
 
If the questions identified in this section are not addressed, 
and likewise, if the identified technical problems are not 
rectified, then implementation of the Calman tax proposals 
could rapidly prove very unsatisfactory for all the parties 
concerned. This could, paradoxically, weaken the existing 
union – quite counter to Calman’s stated aim of introducing 
change which would actually strengthen the union. 
 
 
Conclusions 
We draw three main conclusions from the above.  
 
1. The transitional arrangements introduced in the White 
Paper make the first of the technical problems identified 
in our open letter significantly worse. The effect is that, 
with the transitional arrangements in operation, the curve 
relating the revenues a Scottish government will receive 
to the Scottish rate of income tax will always be upward 
sloping. Even if a Scottish government were able to 
stimulate the Scottish economy by a combined stimulus 
package involving income tax cuts, and even if this had 
the effect of increasing overall income tax revenues in 
Scotland, its own revenues would reduce. Conversely, 
under the transitional arrangements, a Scottish 
government could always increase its revenues by 
raising the Scottish rate of tax, even if this meant severe 
deflation of the Scottish economy, and a reduction in 
overall income tax revenues in Scotland. These effects 
are so perverse, that we argue it would be disastrous if 
FEBRUARY 2010        PAGE 43 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
PAGE 44 VOLUME 33  NUMBER 3 
the White Paper on the Calman proposals on income tax 
were implemented as they stand. 
 
2. The complete absence from the White Paper of any 
discussion of technical issues relating to tax, and the 
introduction in the White Paper of transitional 
arrangements, without any apparent appreciation of the 
significant effects these would have, both indicate an 
altogether inadequate level of technical treatment in the 
drafting of the White Paper. We conclude that any 
serious attempt to reform the taxation arrangements for 
the Scottish government should proceed on the basis of 
a much more informed level of technical discussion. A 
cynic might say that the absence of consideration of 
technical issues in the White Paper suggests that the 
White Paper is more of a political document, rather than 
a serious attempt to reform the taxation arrangements 
for devolution.   
 
3. The Calman report, and the subsequent White Paper, 
are alike deficient in the limited attention they pay to 
analysing the effect which the introduction of their 
proposals on taxation would have on the way in which 
the different levels of government interact. There are 
fundamental questions here which need to be addressed 
in much more detail. In particular, it is not clear whether 
it would be feasible to devise a workable system of tax 
sharing without moving towards a more federal system 
of government. Similarly, both documents neglect the 
important question of how effective the proposed tax 
varying powers would be as a tool which the Scottish 
government could use in economic management, and 
fiscal policy. We conclude that any attempt to reform the 
tax arrangements for devolution should involve a much 
more detailed assessment of such issues. 
 
 
____________________ 
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1(The text of our open letter, together with subsequent 
correspondence with the Scotland Office, can be found at 
www.cuthbert1.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk ). 
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Annex 1: The conditions under which anomalous movements in tax revenues occur 
 
Suppose that the original Calman proposals on income tax are in operation.  
 
The basic rate is considered first. 
Let T(y) = total basic rate tax revenues in Scotland, when tax levied at rate y: 
let f(x) = basic rate revenue going to the Scottish government, when it sets its tax rate at x. 
Now when the Scottish government sets its tax rate at x, it will, to a good approximation, receive a proportion 
 x) (10
x

 of the 
basic rate revenues raised in Scotland when the aggregate rate is (10+x). So the fundamental relationship between f and T is 
that  
  
x)T(10
 x) (10
x
   f(x)  
 . 
The anomalous condition that we are interested in occurs, by definition, when the slopes, (that is, the first derivatives), of 
and have opposite signs.  f(x) x)T(10 
Differentiating with respect to x, we can see that 
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   = ) x)T(10 
 x) (10
10
  x)(10'  xT( 
 x) (10
1
                       (1) 
It follows from expression (1) that  whenever 0   (x)' f ! 0   x)(10' T !  : so the anomaly can never occur when 
. 
0   x)(10' T !
It also follows from (1) that  
            if and only if       0   (x)' f ! 0   ) x)T(10 
 x) (10
10
  x)(10'  xT(   ! , 
 that is, 
 if and only if     x)T(10 
 x) x(10
10-
     x)(10' T    !     . 
This implies that the anomaly will occur if, and only if, 
 
      x)T(10 
 x) x(10
10-
     x)(10' T    0    !!  
 
Looking at the key “starting position” of x=10 in more detail, it is possible to identify more precisely the conditions under which 
the anomaly will occur: namely, 
if and only if      )01T(10 
10)  10(10
10-
     )01(10' T    0    !!  
  that is if and only if  5-   
20
100-
    
T(20)
(20).100' T
    0  !!  . 
 
The term in the middle of this last expression is approximately the percentage change in overall basic rate tax revenues in 
Scotland, resulting from a 1p increase in the tax rate: (this can be seen on taking the first two terms in a Taylor expansion). So 
the anomaly will occur if a 1p increase in the tax rate in Scotland leads to a reduction in total basic rate revenues collected, but 
a reduction which is less than 5%. An alternative way of expressing the same condition is that a 1p reduction in the tax rate 
leads to an increase in revenues collected at the basic rate, but an increase which is less than 5%. This is the form of the 
condition quoted in the text of the paper. 
 
The algebra for revenues coming from the higher rate tax bands is similar, but the numbers are different.  Let H(y) represent 
total tax revenues in Scotland from the middle tax band, (currently the 40% tax band), when tax is levied at rate y: then what the 
Scottish government gets from this tax band, when it sets its tax rate at x, is x)H(30
 x) (30
x
   . A similar argument to the 
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above shows that the critical threshold in this case is 7.5%, (as compared to 5% for the basic rate tax band). Similarly, for the 
highest rate tax band, (currently 50%), the critical threshold is 8%.  
  
Annex 2: The conditions under which a general tax sharing system will avoid the anomaly 
 
Consider the basic rate.  
 
As in Annex 1, let T(y) = total basic rate tax revenues in Scotland, when tax levied at rate y: 
let f(x) = basic rate revenue going to the Scottish government, when it sets its tax rate at x. 
Consider a general tax sharing system, defined by the relationship 
 
  f(x) = a(x) T(10+x) + c,  
 
where a(x) is the proportion of overall basic rate tax revenues going to the Scottish government when it sets its tax rate at x, and 
c is a constant, (which could be zero). 
 
It is reasonable to assume . 0  (x)a' t
Again, we are interested in the slope or first derivative of f(x). Now, 
 
x)T(10 (x)a'  x)(10T' a(x)  (x)' f   
, 
 
Since  x)T(10 (x)a'  x)(10T' a(x)  (x)' f   , 
it follows that and (x)' f x)(10T'   will have the same signs if either  
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 that is, if 0    x)(10T'   , and 
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(x)a'

  . 
 
In words, these conditions mean that the anomaly will not occur if the effect of an increase in the rate of tax is to increase total 
revenues collected in Scotland: or if the effect of an increase in the rate of tax is to reduce revenues collected, while at the same 
time the percentage increase in the proportion of income tax revenues coming to the Scottish government is smaller than the 
percentage decrease in overall revenues. 
 
Annex 3: Under the White Paper transitional arrangements, the slope of the curve relating the 
Scottish Government’s revenues to the Scottish rate of income tax is positive, for all feasible tax 
rates. 
 
For simplicity, we ignore for the present the higher rates of tax. As in the previous annexes, let T(y) = total basic rate tax 
revenues in Scotland, when tax is levied at rate y. 
Let B = block grant which would have come to Scottish government, if the tax sharing arrangement in Calman had not been 
implemented. (Both B and T will also be functions of time: but for the purposes of the present argument, we lose nothing by 
omitting the time variable.) 
Let f(x) now represent the total revenues coming to the Scottish government, from both the block grant, and via its share of 
income tax, assuming the White Paper transitional arrangements are operational, when the Scottish rate of tax is x. Then, if the 
Westminster government is accurate in its estimate of how much 10p accounts for out of the total tax take in Scotland, what the 
Scottish government will receive will be B, reduced by the transitional adjustment of 10/(x+10) of T(10+x), plus the amount 
raised by the Scottish rate of tax, which is x/(x+10) of T(10+x). Thus, 
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Looking at the expression within the square brackets, there are then four different cases to consider, as follows:- 
(a) If , and if x > 10: in this case,  always. 0  x)(10T' ! 0  (x)' f !
(b) If , and if : in this case,  0  x)(10T' ! 10 x  0  (x)' f !
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But the function on the right hand side of this expression is an increasing function of x on the range (0, 10). So condition (3) will 
always be satisfied if  
x)T(10
x)(10T'


is less than the value of the expression on the right evaluated at x=0. But the value of the 
expression at x=0 is 0.2 .  So if the percentage increase in total basic rate tax revenues raised in Scotland stemming from a unit 
increase in the tax rate is less than 20%, (which under any feasible scenario will always be the case), then the implication is that 
will indeed be positive in case (b).  (x)' f
(c) If , and if x < 10: in this case,  always. 0  x)(10T'  0  (x)' f !
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But the function on the right hand side of this expression is a decreasing function of x for x>10. So condition (4) will always be 
satisfied for x in the range 10 < x < 15, say, if  
x)T(10
x)(10T'-


is less than the value of the expression on the right evaluated at 
x=15. But the value of the expression at x=15 is 0.16 .  So if the percentage decrease in basic rate tax revenues stemming from 
a unit increase in the tax rate is less than 16%, (which under any feasible scenario is always likely to be the case), then the 
implication is that will indeed be positive in case (d), at least for all x in the range 0 < x < 15. It would appear very 
unlikely that a Scottish government would ever set a Scottish rate of tax which is more than 5p higher than the rate in the rest of 
the UK. 
 (x)' f
In each of the four possible cases, therefore,  either without any further conditions, or under conditions which are 
always likely to be met in practice. This justifies our assertion that  for all feasible tax rates. 
0  (x)' f !
0  (x)' f !
 
The above proof has been given for the basic rate case. Essentially the same argument goes through, and the same 
conclusions apply, for the intermediate and higher bands, with the following changes:- 
The relevant terms in formula (2) become x)H(30
30)(x
10)-(x   and x)G(4040)(x
10)-(x   for the intermediate and highest 
rate bands respectively, where the functions H and G represent total revenues at these bands. 
In case (b), the figure of 20% for the basic rate becomes 13.3% for the intermediate rate, and 12.5% for the highest rate. 
In case (d), the figure of 16% for the basic rate becomes 17.7% for the intermediate rate, and 18.2% for the highest rate.
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Abstract 
Hailed by WWF Scotland as a “World First”, the Scottish 
Government in late September 2009 published a Carbon 
Assessment of their draft 2010-11 budget.  Undertaken a 
year in advance of this assessment becoming a statutory 
requirement under the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, 
this exercise produced some interesting results and 
generated a lot of interest. This article is intended to provide 
an overview of the exercise that was undertaken, and to 
highlight and address some outstanding issues that 
surround the assessment. 
 
Introduction 
In an address to the Scottish Parliament on 23rd January 
2008 announcing his draft budget for 2009-10, John 
Swinney MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Finance and 
Sustainable Growth, outlined his proposals to produce 
estimates of the green house gas (GHG) embodied in 
Scottish Government budget spending. “It is a carbon 
assessment tool that can be applied across all Government 
spending in Scotland. Taking account of carbon impacts is 
already part of the best-value duty and it is an auditable 
requirement in the public sector, but the new carbon 
assessment tool will be applied to all Government spending 
in Scotland.1” There was already by this time, and continued 
to be thereafter, a substantial amount of work undertaken to 
fulfil this commitment.   
 
The consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers were 
commissioned by the Scottish Government to undertake the 
initial assessment to determine the best tools to employ in 
producing a reasonable estimate of the Carbon that is 
‘supported’ through the spending contained in the draft 
budget. Following consultations and an expert workshop 
held in November 2008, it was decided that the best 
methodology to employ in the 2010-11 assessment would 
be to use an environmentally augmented Input-Output (EIO) 
analysis. In evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s Transport, 
Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee on 29th 
September 2009, Dr Thomas Wiedmann- Director of the 
Centre for Sustainability Accounting, and research associate 
of the Stockholm Environment Institute at the University of 
York, commented that the methodology employed in the 
High Level Carbon Assessment was “exactly the right one”.2 
however he cautioned that care needed to be taken in 
interpreting the results of the assessment. The reason for 
this qualification will become clearer as we proceed through 
this article. 
 
The full details of the methodology employed can be found 
in a paper entitled “Outlining the methodology and issues 
involved in the Carbon Assessment of the Scottish 
Government budget for 2010/11” 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/09/17102339/
10. The purpose of this article is to give a brief overview of 
the issues involved, and to highlight some of the criticisms 
and reactions to the assessment.  
 
The models used 
Two separate Input-Output models were utilized in the 
Carbon assessment of the budget. The first model was an 
open economy 123-sector Input-Output model for Scotland, 
augmented with UK emissions intensity data to create an 
EIO model. The UK pollution intensities that were applied 
were the GHG intensity of a unit of each sectors output in 
the UK economy. These GHG-Output coefficients that were 
calculated were then inflated to the base year of the 
proposed budget spend (2010-11) using HM Treasury 
inflators.3 It is worth noting here, that UK GHG intensity data 
was utilized throughout this assessment due to the lack of 
comprehensive Scottish GHG data in a form that is 
compatible with the Input-Output system.  
 
The second model used was a closed economy 123-sector 
UK Input-Output model. A UK rather than a Scottish closed-
economy model was chosen because the UK economy (and 
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hence IO model) is broader and therefore more reflective of 
a world model. For example there are sectors that are not 
present in the Scottish IO model or economy, such as the 
tobacco sector, whereas the UK model is broader and 
encompasses many of the sectors and industries that the 
Scottish IO system, and hence economy, lacks. Without the 
utilization of this second closed economy IO model, the first 
(Scottish) open economy model would not have captured 
the imports and hence the emissions embodied in imports 
required to meet the Scottish Government final demand 
represented in the budget. As a result, the EIO would have 
underestimated the emissions embodied in the Scottish 
Government’s proposed 2010-11 budget. The methodology 
applied here in respect of the closed economy model is 
similar to that adopted by Wiedmann et al (2006) and the 
interested reader is pointed to their paper for a fuller outline. 
 
The entire analysis was carried out using the Type I and 
Type II Scottish open-economy and Type I UK closed-
economy Leontief Inverses. The distinction between Type I 
and Type II Leontief analysis is important. Type I Leontief 
Inverses treat Households as a category of final demand 
and thus as an exogenous driver of the Input-Output 
system. Using Type II Leontief Inverses means that we treat 
Households as a production sector, using their consumption 
demands as their inputs and their labour services as their 
outputs. This type of analysis allows us to consider and 
calculate what is referred to in the literature as the ‘induced 
emission effects’. That is, given that households receive 
remuneration for their labour services and then use that 
remuneration to purchase goods and services, and that this 
gives rise to the pollution being emitted to meet these 
consumption demands, we can calculate the emissions that 
are induced through the initial demand for labour services. 
In this case, these would be the emissions that result from 
households employment to meet Scottish Government 
consumption demands.  
 
Running this model required asking the same question of 
both of these Input-Output systems: what would the direct, 
indirect (and in the case of the Scottish domestic model the 
induced) output/emissions generated by an additional spend 
of X on the output of a particular industry be? In order to do 
this within the EIO framework, each spending line in the 
draft budget (at the chosen level of disaggregation) had to 
be mapped to a single IOC industry category. (The IOC 
categories are based on the Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) scheme which classifies all the industries in the 
economy by type, and covers all categories of industry in 
the economy).4
 This was done under the pragmatic principle 
of assigning each spending line to the IOC industry category 
of the recipient industry. This is not an exact process and 
there is necessarily an element of approximation in this 
aspect of the analysis. 
 
Since the EIO employed was an extension of the UK and 
Scottish IO tables, and the standard 123 industry tables 
were available for the UK closed economy model and 126 
sector tables were available for the Scottish domestic 
model, these were used in full for the initial analysis.  
However as with all IO analyses some aggregation was 
needed to reconcile the economic Input-Output models with 
the available environmental data, this reduced the resolution 
of the analysis. There are inescapable difficulties that occur 
in using this methodology, some of these were subsequently 
addressed through adjustments to the core methodology 
and these are discussed later in this article, others are 
simply unavoidable issues that always occur in the 
application of the EIO methodology and must be borne in 
mind by the reader. 
 
The traditional criticism of the use of this type of demand 
driven framework for modelling analysis is that it assumes 
that there are no supply constraints. In other words, given 
that the Input-Output system embodies the interrelations 
and industrial linkages of the economy in a particular year to 
meet a particular level of final demand, it is likely to be the 
case that the composition of the economy would change if it 
were required to meet a different level of output. Examples 
of this would include the exploitation of economies of scale 
by a particular sector, if say, it were faced by an increase in 
demand for that sector’s output. In this case though we are 
not asking these models to assess the impact of an entirely 
new increase in final demand, since the total managed 
expenditure in the Scottish Government budget (which is 
included in the existing Scottish IO framework) has been 
fairly consistent, rising from £27.7 billion in 2005-06 to £33.1 
billion in 2008-09. So, while this criticism is still important, it 
applies more to dynamic modelling questions, and is of less 
of a concern when looking at the emissions impact of actual 
demand. 
 
Transportation spending and emissions 
On the day that the report itself was published, the 
immediate concern was that it omitted the environmental 
impact of people using the new roads that the government’s 
budget was planning to build. To explain, assume that the 
government earmarked money in the budget to build a new 
road. The high level assessment that was carried out would 
include an estimate of the environmental impact of the 
materials purchased and used in the construction, other 
expenditure on the actual construction of the road and the 
impact deriving from the spending of the wages earned by 
the workers as a result of the construction of the road, but 
not the use of the road by motorists. This omission has been 
criticised. However these impacts are not, strictly speaking, 
totally omitted. The misunderstanding here derives from a 
lack of clarity over what Input-Output analyses does. The 
high level EIO analysis does include some of the emissions 
from the use of roads- as distinct from the construction of 
roads- through the induced emissions effect that operates 
through the impact on household income of Scottish 
Government spending.  
 
Consider it like this. People don’t just drive their cars (and 
hence emit pollution) because roads are built or exist – 
although it does seem likely that we would drive much less if 
there were no roads! People drive because they need to, 
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Figure 1: Domestic emissions (direct + indirect + induced) by industrial sector (with all local government spending 
treated as IOC 115) 
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Figure 2:  Domestic emissions (direct + indirect + induced) by industrial sector (with the ‘General Revenue Grant’ and 
‘Non-Domestic Rate’ expenditure on local government disaggregated into 5 separate IOCs) 
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               Chart 1:  Estimated domestic and imported GHG emission of tonnes of CO2 equivalent) by portfolio and generating industry.  Scottish Government Draft Budget 2010/11 

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but also because they can afford to. If the government 
builds a new road people may drive more than before, if say 
it cuts journey times. However car ownership and distance 
travelled increase primarily with increases in income.5 The 
‘household’ environmental impacts, which in this case derive 
from the household spending the income they will receive 
from the proposed Scottish Government budget, are 
estimated and included in this assessment. This includes 
household expenditure, and hence emissions, associated 
with their transportation demands. So the economy wide 
‘induced’ effect of Government spending, which supports 
emissions indirectly by paying households for their labour 
which households then spend on goods and services - the 
production of which causes pollution - is included here 
 
It could be argued that the Scottish Government ought to 
take into account the effects of its actions (in improving 
infrastructure) on the behaviour of the entire country, or of 
every user of that infrastructure. That would require its own 
distinct analysis of the environmental impact of these 
improvements in infrastructure. However it is important to 
point out that in terms of responsibility, the high level 
assessment of the Scottish Budget does include the 
environmental impact of the Scottish Government spending 
on labour services (employees- both civil servants and 
those employed by businesses that provide goods and 
services to the Scottish Government) based as with this 
entire analysis on UK GHG economy wide average data.  
 
The budget analysis should perhaps be augmented with this 
type of individual level assessments, and indeed this is a 
point for development that is acknowledged in the report 
itself, but it is incorrect to say that it does not include the 
environmental impact of the Scottish Government’s budget 
in supporting road use - it does, but only that element of it 
that it directly supports through household income and 
employment. As Dr Wiedmann pointed out to the TICC 
Committee, in this entire exercise “there is a shared-
responsibility perspective, in that the assessment shows the 
emissions that an activity generates, but the actors who 
produce those emissions are throughout the economy-they 
are industry and consumers.” 6 This encapsulates an 
important point about the assessment - that it is an 
evaluation of the Scottish Government’s impact on what is 
ultimately a shared responsibility across the Scottish 
economy. 
 
Other adjustments made 
There were several tweaks to the standard methodology 
that were applied in the case of particular items of 
expenditure. This was done to increase the resolution of the 
analysis and to try to make the analysis as robust as 
possible. Here we simply summarise the main adjustments 
that were made to the standard methodology outlined 
above. The first item that was adjusted was the 
categorization of the block grant payments to local 
authorities contained within the budget. These two transfers, 
the General Revenue Grant (£8.4bn) and Non-Domestic 
Rates (£2bn), could simply have been classified in the 
analysis under IOC 115 (Public Administration), as the 
closest industry classification for these spending lines.  
 
However using the Scottish input-output tables for Scotland, 
specifically the Local Authority final demand column, these 
spend lines were split proportionally over the categories of 
Local Authority final demand. This increased the resolution 
of the analysis by considering these spending lines as more 
than block transfers, but as actual spending by local 
authorities on goods and services. The effect of this 
disaggregation is shown below. Figure 1 shows the 
breakdown with all Scottish Government spending put 
through as IOC 115 “Public Administration”, while Figure 2 
shows the emissions breakdown with expenditure on Local 
Authorities disaggregated into the local authority final 
demand IOC’s. It is clear that this disaggregation changes 
the composition of emissions supported by Scottish 
Government transfers to local authorities. The overall 
emissions levels supported by this expenditure changes as 
a result of this disaggregation from 4.3 MT of CO2 
equivalent to 4.6 MT of CO2 equivalent, an increase of 
nearly 7%. 
 
Other adjustments were made to the high-level assessment. 
For example, capital spending lines in the budget were ‘top 
sliced’ to account for the proportion of capital spending that 
were estimated to be spent outwith Scotland- this used 
gross fixed capital formation imports estimates that are 
calculated as part of the construction of the Scottish Supply 
and Use Tables. This was to make the assessment better 
reflect the emissions that the Scottish Government’s 
consumption supports within Scotland. This top slicing 
occurred only in the vector applied to the Scottish EIO, not 
the UK Closed Economy EIO for obvious reasons. 
 
The final adjustment that we will cover here was an 
adjustment made to all the capital spending lines of the 
budget. Whilst it is correct to assign revenue spending to the 
industry receiving the money in a final demand model, when 
dealing with capital spending (which is itself a final demand 
category within IO tables) it is not appropriate to do so. In a 
similar way to the Local Authority disaggregation outlined 
above, all the capital spending lines in the budget were 
disaggregated over a number of IOCs. Applying the 
methodology outlined at the start of this paper would have 
resulted in many of these spending lines being linked in the 
EIO with IOC 115 (Public Administration) which would have 
resulted in large amounts of the capital spend being 
considered (within the EIO) as being spent on items that 
were not sensible destinations for capital spending, like IOC 
98 ‘Postal and courier services’. 
  
Instead each capital spending line in the budget was 
disaggregated across the sectoral destination of Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) spending using underlying 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation estimates (used in the 
construction of the Scottish Supply and Use Tables to 
construct the GFCF columns of the Scottish combined use 
matrix). These underlying data estimate the types of capital 
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purchases across 29 industry categories. For capital 
spending items the IOC assigned to the spending line is 
mapped to one of these 29 broad industry capital spending 
patterns and the amount allocated across all 126 IOCs 
accordingly. As would seem reasonable this tends to result 
in these capital amounts being run through the EIO (mostly) 
on the construction, computer services and motor vehicles 
industries.  
 
The results 
We do not replicate the full results here; these are available 
from the full report, which is available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/09/17102339/
10. Here we simply summarise and commentate on the 
main results contained in Chart 1. This chart shows the 
estimated emissions supported by each portfolio, and also 
shows the emissions intensity of each portfolio; this is the 
average level of emissions supported by each Million 
pounds of spending by that portfolio. 
 
It is clear from Chart 1 that the portfolio whose spending 
embodies the largest emissions intensity (shown by the 
black bar on the chart) is the Rural Affairs & Environment 
portfolio. Similarly the portfolio with the largest total 
emissions is the portfolio with the largest share of the 
budget, i.e. Local Government, which in part motivated our 
earlier adjustment to increase the resolution of the 
environmental impact of this spending.  Further, the lower 
part of Chart 1 shows the pattern of emissions by emitting 
industry for each of the corresponding portfolios; these 
indicate the sectors of the economy that are important in 
generating the emissions supported by the spending of each 
cabinet portfolio. So, for example, emissions from the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector is the main source 
of emissions generated through the spending by the Rural 
Affairs and Environment portfolio. This may seem strange at 
first, but when you consider that the classification 
‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing’ includes a broad swath of 
firms that supply and operate in the agricultural sector, it 
makes sense. A similar analysis can be carried out for each 
of the other portfolio level results, and the reader is referred 
to the principal budget document for more information on 
these. 
 
An interesting result lies in the comparison of the Local 
Government and Health & Wellbeing emissions estimates 
above. The total spending in both these portfolios is very 
similar in size in the draft budget (Health and Wellbeing 
totals £11,438 Million, and Local Government totals £11,580 
Million) however the emissions embodied in this spend is 
estimated to be quite different. Emissions supported by the 
spending of the Health & Wellbeing portfolio total 3495.8 
thousand tonnes of CO2 equivalent, compared to 4270.5 
thousand tonnes of CO2 equivalent for the spending on 
Local Government in the budget. 
 
The explanation for this difference lies in the nature of the 
spending patterns across each portfolio. The emissions 
embodied in spending across the aggregated sectors of the 
economy shown in the lower part of Chart 1, show that for 
these two portfolios the emissions patterns are broadly 
similar. The main difference is that the Local Government 
portfolio supports far more emissions from the ‘Other 
Services’ category.  This is indicative of the fact that in the 
Local Government portfolio, more money is spent on ‘Other 
services’ than in the Health & Wellbeing portfolio, and the 
‘Other Services’ category here includes a number of 
emission intensive sectors like ‘Sewage and Sanitary 
Services’. So while these two portfolios spend similar 
amounts in total, the differences in their spending patterns 
does inform, in a realistic way, the emissions estimates that 
were produced. (All figures used in this example come from 
table 2 on page 11 of the Carbon Assessment of the 
Scottish Governments Budget 2010-11 document, available 
online at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/09/17102339/
10.) 
 
Concluding remarks 
The use of Input-Output analysis for environmental-
economic assessments is an important and current area of 
economic research. The ESRC currently fund a number of 
researchers looking into the issue of climate change, 
emissions reductions and carbon assessments from a range 
of different backgrounds. The Fraser of Allander Institute at 
the University of Strathclyde currently holds, through Dr 
Karen Turner, an ESRC Climate Change Leadership 
Fellowship7, to look at this issue from an economic 
perspective for the UK, including regional and interregional 
analysis within the UK. The regional analysis that the 
Scottish Government has done in this assessment is unique 
in the world at the moment, but it is only one part of the far 
wider array of applications of economic analysis to issues of 
emissions analysis and the analysis of the environmental 
impact of the economy.  
 
The Scottish Government is continuing to work on 
improvements and extensions to the methodology described 
in this paper, and the scope and nature of future 
assessments (which are on a statutory footing from 2010) is 
still to be determined. To this end they have presented 
these findings and this methodology to a number of 
academic and policy forums receiving in the process 
valuable feedback on both the methodology and ideas for 
the future developments. Comments, suggestions and 
feedback on this analysis are still sought and we hope that 
people, having read this article, will feel encouraged to 
contribute to the debate. 
__________________ 
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Introduction 
Policies that aim to use increased energy efficiency to 
reduce energy use may not achieve the desired results due 
to the likelihood of rebound effects. Research from our 
current ESRC-funded project on this topic was presented in 
an article in the last issue of Fraser Economic Commentary 
titled, ‘Energy Efficiency and the rebound effect’ (Turner, 
2009a). As explained there, the rebound effect occurs when 
an energy efficiency improvement causes a decrease in the 
effective or implicit price of energy as an input to production 
(or consumption) – i.e. the cost of energy required per unit 
of activity falls as efficiency improves.1   Moreover, if there is 
local production/distribution of energy (or energy services) 
the reduction in demand for energy as efficiency improves 
will put downward pressure on the actual (local) energy 
price. 
 
Such reductions in prices may lead to increased demand for 
energy throughout the economy that partially or even wholly 
offsets the anticipated energy savings from the efficiency 
improvement. Where the increase in energy use is sufficient 
to entirely offset the initial energy savings, this extreme case 
of rebound is known as backfire. In the previous article in 
the Fraser Economic Commentary (Turner, 2009a), we 
explained that demand responses that drive rebound (or 
backfire) take the form of substitution, income, 
output/competitiveness and composition effects, and that 
the strength of these relative to the pure efficiency effect will 
determine the magnitude of rebound. Moreover, the strength 
of these effects will depend on economic conditions in the 
economy being studied.  
 
However, we also noted that while most of rebound 
analyses to date have focussed on these demand side 
responses, our research has highlighted that it is equally 
important to consider the supply-side response to changing 
energy demand and local energy prices. In this article, 
therefore, we summarise findings reported in Turner (2008, 
2009b) and Anson and Turner (2009), which consider the 
local supply response and identify negative multiplier and 
disinvestment effects as key factors determining the 
economy-wide outcome of energy efficiency improvements.  
 
Negative multiplier effects in local energy 
supply sectors 
Multiplier analysis is a familiar term that is commonly used 
when discussing shocks or disturbances in one area of the 
economy that have ripple effects throughout the whole 
economy. For example, by using the Scottish Input Output 
(IO) tables (e.g. Scottish Government, 2004), published 
annually by the Scottish Government, interactions and 
linkages between different production and final consumption 
sectors can be observed and analysed through simple 
analytical techniques. Multipliers, as the name suggests, 
allow us to quantify the magnitude of effect that introducing 
a change in one area of the economy (usually a change in 
final demand for the outputs of local production sectors) can 
have on the wider economic system.  
 
In the context of a change in technology, such as an energy 
efficiency improvement, there will be a contraction in 
demand for energy (the pure efficiency effect), which will 
have knock-on effects throughout the local economy, 
particularly (or directly) on local energy producers. It is 
important to note that IO techniques are not ideally suited to 
modelling the impacts of supply disturbances, such as 
increased efficiency in the use of energy, particularly 
because of the lack of consideration of prices (which, as 
noted above, are the key driver of rebound effects). 2   For 
this reason the current project employs more sophisticated 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
techniques. However, the basic IO reasoning, which focuses 
on backward linkages between sectors, helps us understand 
what may happen to local energy supply sectors when 
increased energy efficiency leads to a reduction in demand 
for their outputs, and how this will feed through and impact 
on the magnitude of the rebound effect.  
 
Turner (2008, 2009b) investigates negative multiplier effects 
in Scottish and UK energy supply sectors as a possible 
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Figure 1:   Short run changes in energy use in Scottish production in response to a 5% improvement in efficiency in 
the non energy supply sectors - limited price responsiveness 
 

 
 
Source: Turner (2008) 
 
explanation for the finding of negative rebound effects – i.e. 
economy-wide energy savings that are greater than those 
suggested by the initial energy efficiency improvement. 3   
This finding runs contrary to the basic idea underlying 
rebound that any extent of (direct or indirect) 
responsiveness to changes in the implicit and/or actual price 
of energy will result in positive rebound effects. However, in 
an IO analysis, where there is no consideration of price 
effects whatsoever, and where there is local production 
and/or distribution of energy, negative multiplier effects in 
energy supply sectors would be the only impact of an 
energy efficiency improvement. In order to identify a more 
realistic scenario, Turner (2008, 2009b) employs CGE 
analysis to simulate a 5% increase in energy efficiency 
under conditions where there is very limited price 
responsiveness in the system to examine whether negative 
multiplier effects are sufficient to generate negative rebound 
effects. In order to focus on the multiplier effects in energy 
supply sectors, the analysis excludes these sectors from the 
efficiency shock itself. The results for the Scottish case 
(which are qualitatively similar to those reported for the UK 
in Turner, 2009b) are shown in Figure 1. 
 
What the results in Figure 1 show is that, even with almost 
zero price responsiveness, there are positive rebound 
effects in all (but one) ‘energy use’ sectors that have been 
subject to the 5% energy efficiency improvement (i.e. short 
run reductions in energy consumption are less than 5%). 
The exception is Construction, but the situation is 
complicated here by the fact that this sector largely serves 
investment demand, which, as we will discuss in the next 
section, are likely to decrease in the area of energy supply 
when the demand response to falling prices is so restricted.  
 
Instead, the source of the negative rebound effect in this 
scenario is the reduction in energy use in the energy supply 
sectors themselves (where there has been no efficiency 
improvement). This is the result of the direct reduction in 
demand in the energy use sectors, but also knock-on 
contractions from the energy supply sectors, where 
production tends to be very energy intensive.  
 
Disinvestment effects in local energy supply 
sectors 
The negative multiplier effects observed in Figure 1 may 
carry through to the longer run.  However, after the initial 
reduction in demand from the pure efficiency effect, it is the 
impact on implicit and/or actual energy prices that drive the 
substitution, income, competitiveness and composition 
effects (discussed in the previous article - Turner, 2009a) 
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Figure 2:   Percentage change in UK local energy supply prices in response to a 5% improvement in energy efficiency 
in all production sectors (applied to locally supplied energy) 
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Source: Turner (2009b) 
 
 
Figure 3:  Impact on capital rental rates in the UK energy supply sectors of a 5% increase in energy efficiency in all 
production sectors (% change from base) 
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Figure 4:  Impact of a 5% energy efficiency improvement in the Scottish Transport sector on capital rental rates and 
capital stocks in the Scottish Oil supply sector (% change from base) 
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analysis. Note that there is a substantial decrease in the 
actual price of output in the (both renewable and non-
renewable) electricity supply sectors. Particularly due to the 
lack of trade in electricity between the UK and rest of the 
world (i.e. there is very limited external demand response to 
these decreased prices), the demand response to this drop 
in prices is insufficient to prevent a drop in revenue in these 
sectors. In turn, this reduces the return on capital, as shown 
in Figure 3. This leads to shedding of capital stock (and 
capacity) in these energy supply sectors. This tightening of 
energy supply causes local energy prices to rise, which 
allows the return on capital in these sectors to adjust back to 
their initial real levels (and equate with the user cost of 
capital, so that equilibrium can be restored in the economy). 
This process is illustrated in Figure 2. It is this ‘rebound’ in 
local energy prices that leads to the dampening of the long-
run rebound in energy use in the UK case modelled by 
Turner (2009b). 
that drive rebound. As noted above, these are all demand 
responses to changing prices. However, Turner (2009b) and 
Anson and Turner (2009) demonstrate that it is also 
important to consider the supply response to changing 
prices, particularly in the case of local energy supply 
sectors.  
 
The key point to understand is that when the price of a 
commodity or service falls, if there is not a sufficient demand 
response then revenues and, in turn, the profitability of the 
sector that produces these as output will fall, leading 
investors to relocate their capital where the return is greater. 
In the context of a decrease in local (actual) energy prices 
triggered by an efficiency improvement, this will occur in the 
case of the local energy supply sectors. Turner (2008, 
2009b) refers to this process as the ‘disinvestment effect’. 
Unlike negative multiplier effects that dampen rebound 
immediately after an energy efficiency improvement, the 
disinvestment effect takes hold as we move into the longer 
term. However, it is triggered by the (negative) impact on 
local energy supply prices and capital rental rates 
immediately after the shock is introduced. 
 
 
Turner (2009b) finds that disinvestment effects do constrain 
the rebound effect in the UK under most assumed 
simulation scenarios (which relate to differing degrees of 
price responsiveness in the system). However, Turner 
(2008) shows that, given the different structure of the 
Scottish economy, and particularly the extent of trade of 
 
Figure 2 shows the impact of a 5% increase in energy 
efficiency all production sectors on local energy supply 
prices of the UK economy from Turner’s (2009b) UK CGE  
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energy supply sector outputs, this is generally a less 
common outcome in the case of Scotland. 
Generally, Turner’s (2008, 2009b) results show that the 
influence of the disinvestment effect is reduced the more 
price responsiveness we bring into the system (the next 
question then, is correctly specifying direct and indirect price 
responsiveness throughout the system – this is the focus of 
current research, as noted in the conclusion section). 
 
However, the analyses reported so far are fairly broadbrush 
in so much as all sectors of the economy are targeted with 
the same efficiency shock. We have also carried out 
research at the sectoral level, first in a report to Scottish 
Government (Allan et al 2008), but later, and with more 
detailed analysis in Anson and Turner (2009). Here, the 
(5%) energy efficiency improvement is targeted specifically 
(and solely) at the Scottish commercial transport sector. 
Here, even with a fairly flexible degree of price 
responsiveness on the demand side of the economy, we do 
observe disinvestment in the Scottish refined oil supply 
sector (hereafter simply the ‘Oil’ sector), the major energy 
supplier to the transport sector. Figure 4 shows the impact 
on the return in capital in the ‘Oil’ supply  sector and the 
consequent contraction in capital stock. 
 
The presence of disinvestment in the Scottish ‘Oil’ supply 
sector as a result of changes to the Scottish commercial 
transport sector is illustrative of our argument that rebound 
and disinvestment effects are specific to the economic 
structure under observation and the sectors targeted with 
the efficiency improvement. In fact all our research in this 
area has shown is that the key drivers of rebound (and also 
the disinvestment effect) are sensitive to the flexibility and 
degree of price responsiveness in the economic system 
being studied. 
 
Conclusions 
The two key result of our rebound research to date are that 
(1) there is positive pressure for rebound effects even where 
(direct and indirect) demands for energy have a low price 
responsiveness, but (2) this may be partially or wholly offset 
by negative multiplier and disinvestment effects that occur in 
response to falling energy demand and prices respectively. 
While the empirical analyses presented here are specific to 
the case studies of Scotland and the UK, we believe that the 
observation and explanation of negative multiplier and 
disinvestment effects that act to dampen rebound effects 
provide a more generic insight. Both will have more general 
significance in analysis of energy efficiency improvements in 
other economies where there is domestic supply of energy. 
Turner (2009b) also argues that the disinvestment effect in 
particular may be applicable at the global level where, 
despite OPEC’s command of marginal supply, downward 
demand pressures do exert downward pressure on prices.  
 
Our results also show that the disinvestment effect is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rebound effects to 
be bigger in the short run than in the long run (as short run 
rebound may also be dampened by negative 
competitiveness effects), a result that runs counter to the 
theoretical predictions of Wei (2007) and Saunders (2008). 
We should note that Wei (2009) has also begun to focus his 
theoretical analysis on supply side issues, partly in response 
to Turner (2009b), but considering the supply response to 
increased energy efficiency more generally (e.g. resource 
scarcity will also be an important issue in analyses with a 
wider geographical focus).  
 
In future research we hope to extend our analysis to an 
interregional framework in order to examine (a) spillover 
rebound effects (i.e. how energy efficiency increases in one 
economy may affect energy use in others, and (b) potential 
negative multiplier and disinvestment effects in energy 
supply sectors in regions/countries that energy is imported 
from (e.g. in our Scottish simulations, the supply and price 
of energy imported from the rest of the UK is exogenous). 
We attempt an interregional analysis of increased labour 
efficiency in Turner and Hanley (2009). This work extends 
on our single region analyses comparing the impacts of 
increased energy and labour efficiency on the CO2 intensity 
of GDP in Turner et al (2009). 
 
Finally, we remind the reader that the results summarised 
here are sensitive to be sensitive to elements of model 
specification. In particular, further research is ongoing to 
attempt to accurately quantify some of the key parameters 
that govern the magnitude of rebound effects, and the 
occurrence of disinvestment effects.  
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes  
 
1The rebound argument holds when there is a change of efficiency 
to any factor of production and not just an energy input. As part of 
this research project we have also looked at changes to labour 
efficiency in the UK and Scottish economies. Links to all project 
outputs to date such papers can be found at 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/viewawardpage.a
spx?awardnumber=RES-061-25-0010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2This is also a problem in modelling the impacts of changes in 
demand.  
 
 
 
3Saunders (2008) discusses the possibility of ‘super conservation’ 
effects where energy savings are proportionately greater than the 
initial increase in energy efficiency. However, Turner’s (2008, 
2009b) CGE 
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This article is an update of an earlier review of Scottish ferry 
policy in this Commentary last year 1 (hence “Fraser 
Commentary Feb 09”) in the light of the outcome of the 
European Commission investigation into alleged State aid 
for Scottish ferries. The European Commission announced 
their investigation2  into alleged State aid for Scottish ferry 
services in May 2008 (hence “EC May 08”) and their final 
Decision3  was published October 2009 (hence EC Oct 09).  
  
This update is intended to be read in conjunction with Fraser 
Commentary Feb 09 to minimise repetition of facts and 
arguments set out in that earlier article.   
 
 
The main conclusion here is that successive Scottish 
administrations have adopted what might be described an 
ostrich approach to ferry policy, burying their heads in the 
sand and hoping that nothing nasty will happen4, and that 
EC Oct 09 has done nothing to rectify this state of affairs.  
The context is set by arguments I made as far back as 2001 
in evidence to the first Parliamentary Inquiry into the 
tendering of CalMac, that it was well established and 
accepted practice (as demonstrated in the case of the UK) 
that in an industry characterized by the provision of an 
essential services, three essential tools were needed: (a) an 
independent regulator; (b) a clearly defined Operator of Last 
Resort able to take over the contract immediately should the 
incumbent withdraw, or if withdrawal is threatened; (c) a well 
developed supporting statutory framework. As I noted in 
Fraser Feb 09, had the problem been properly defined, then 
policy makers would have been more likely to have antici-
pated and dealt with public interest issues that have arisen 
and may well arise in the future. These problems were 
compounded by other failures in terms of interpretation of 
EC law which limited what policymakers could and should 
have done.   
  
These failures have numerous ramifications and we shall 
concentrate briefly on just six issues of concern as indicative 
of possible problems, or as major problems in their own 
right.   
 
1.  Altmark and the need to tender 
EC Oct 09 confirms (para 165) that “in order to establish 
that there is an advantage capable of constituting State aid 
in the sense of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the Commission 
must assess whether the Altmark conditions are fulfilled”.  
The crucial point about this, as noted in Fraser Feb 09, is 
that I and two other academics had produced papers 
independently of each other which argued that there was 
actually no need under EC law to expose the CalMac 
network to the considerable and recurring delays and costs 
that a six-yearly tendering process would involve. As Fraser 
Feb 09 notes, I had pointed out that a coherent alternative 
to tendering could be fashioned consistent with EC law if the 
Altmark conditions were fulfilled. But as Fraser Feb 09 also 
notes, the then Scottish Executive rejected these arguments 
in 2005 claiming instead that the Altmark criteria were not 
applicable to such ferry services.  
 
It is small comfort to note that we were right and the 
government’s legal advisers were wrong, because the result 
has been that the tender process did go ahead, and it is 
almost certain that such services will continue to be put out 
to tender. It is not that tendering is necessarily bad, indeed 
in many contexts it can be in the public interest, but as we 
shall see below, the failures by the government to accept 
the relevance of Altmark and alternatives to tendering when 
combined with other failures noted above raise real dangers 
and risks for the public interest here.  
 
For the alternatives to tendering cited by us to be revisited 
at official level would require officials admitting error; would 
require them to be able and willing to fashion coherent 
alternatives to tendering under the Altmark conditions; and 
would require the European Commission to accept radically 
new proposals fashioned by the same sources that have 
just been investigated by them for alleged breaches of EC 
law.   
 
All things considered, there may be thought to be little 
likelihood of such a reversal of policy taking place. The 
public interest would at least be served by a serious 
investigation as to why these failures took place, though that 
may also be unlikely to happen.  
 
2.  Public service obligations and Altmark in 
Scottish ferry services  
As discussed in Fraser Feb 09, public service obligations 
(PSOs) have a clearly defined role and status in EC law. 
The imposition of PSOs is stated by the Commission as a 
precondition for any subsidy for EC ferry services. Yet as 
noted in Fraser Feb 09, the government echoed its 
predecessor in rejecting arguments that there was a need 
for PSOs for any of its subsidised ferry services.   
 
This was at least folly, because it would have been possible 
to state that the public service contracts (PSCs) contained 
and helped deliver the requisite PSOs here. They chose not 
to adopt that solution but to reject PSOs just as the 
relevance of the Altmark principles had been rejected.  
 
It was therefore not surprising, indeed almost inevitable, that 
when the Commission made their announcement  of 
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intention to investigate these services for supposed 
breaches of State aid legislation, that suspected failure to 
apply clearly specified and justified PSOs and adhere to the 
Altmark principles figured repeatedly in the EC May 08 
charge sheet. Yet EC Oct 09 subsequently found that the 
government and CalMac were largely innocent of these 
charges.     
 
If the Commission had found the charges as set out in EC 
May 08 justified, then in principle it could have led to the 
bankruptcy of CalMac: The government’s opinion as 
reported prior to EC May 08 was that “If found guilty the 
commission could request that CalMac, which is wholly 
owned by ministers and does not have large reserves of 
money, could be forced to repay subsidy which would 
potentially bankrupt the company and could leave our most 
fragile peripheral communities with no links to the mainland 
- or other island communities.”5 
 
 It is worth noting that the dangers were of government’s 
own making, not only by creating what was seen by the 
Commission as prima facie cases of breaches of EC law, 
but also for failing to put in place the safeguards (such as 
Operator of Last Resort) that would guarantee the smooth 
continuance of these lifeline services to these same 
vulnerable communities in the event that the incumbent 
operator was unwilling or unable to continue.  
 
This was an occasion when weakness (on the part of the 
government) was strength. As I noted at the time6 with 
respect to the potential bankruptcy of CalMac for failing to 
adhere to EC law, I doubted whether that would be allowed 
to happen, and so it has proved.  The government of the 
time and its predecessors had put the Commission into an 
impossible situation where the stark choice was between 
finding (as charged) that the government had failed to have 
clearly specified and justified PSOs and adherence to the 
Altmark principles, in which case the remedy could lead to 
the collapse of an entire transportation network providing 
essential services to vulnerable communities; or the 
Commission could conclude (as they did) that despite 
having rejected PSOs and the Altmark principles, the 
government somehow did indeed have properly constituted 
PSOs across the board and had also adhered to these 
same Altmark principles.  
 
If the first scenario facing the Commission could have come 
out of a disaster movie, the second had more the taste of 
Alice in Wonderland.  
 
Given these two choices, the EC Oct 09 Decision was 
undoubtedly the right one in terms of the public interest, as I 
had noted prior to EC May 08; “Were Brussels to close 
down the ferry services, the outrage would not only be felt in 
Scotland, but across Europe,”7    
 
The problem is that while the Decision was the right one in 
terms of the alternatives, it does not provide a solution to the 
problems that policy makers have created here, and we turn 
to some of these now.       
 
3.   Cherry picking  
The most obvious opportunities for cherry picking in ferry 
services depend on the nature and characteristics of the 
route in question, but (just as in postal services) will typically 
target high value and/or low cost services. In an unregulated 
ferry market this is likely to be cars and commercial 
vehicles, freight, short crossings, seasonal traffic, and/or 
highly trafficked routes. The corollary holds; cherry pickers 
are less likely to be interested in off-season, foot passenger, 
longer crossing, and/or lightly trafficked routes.  
 
Cherry picking is not automatically against the public 
interest especially if there can be competition amongst 
cherry pickers within a given market (as in some cases of 
postal services). However, in the ferry markets served by 
CalMac, the likelihood of competition between cherry 
pickers for particular services on a given route is likely to be 
small and if cherry picking takes place on a given route it is 
likely to lead to a local monopoly. There is little if any 
evidence that such markets are likely to be contestable in 
practice, especially since there may be incumbency 
advantages such as sunk costs and timetable slots (for the 
incumbent) and entry costs (for a possible entrant). The 
deficiencies outlined in Fraser Feb 09 to the effect that there 
is no independent industry regulator and statutory 
framework for this industry means the industry is highly 
vulnerable to all the adverse effects that unregulated cherry 
picking and local private monopolies in essential services 
can entail.  
 
4.  Strategic behaviour on the part of bidders 
The implications of the Government's failures to adopt 
normal regulatory safeguards and to have a pre-defined 
qualified Operator of Last Resort contracted to take over 
(overnight, if necessary) in the event of the incumbent 
operator defaulting (or threatening to default) on the contract 
means that there is no real alternative but to continue with 
the tender once it is up and running. This will not be lost on 
future potential bidders for the network. 
 
CalMac will have to defend its right to run the network every 
six years and if it loses just once in the tendering process 
this will effectively eliminate it once and for all as an 
operator - or at least as an operator with the resources and 
capabilities necessary to run such a network.   
 
Bidders will be well aware of that, and also will be aware of 
the deficiencies regarding the absence of a pre-designated 
Operator of Last Resort. There will be an incentive to under-
bid CalMac on the bidding process (and under EC law the 
least subsidy bid must be accepted) knowing that once 
control of the network is secured, the winning bidder will be 
able to renegotiate terms mid-contract.  They will know the 
government will have no alternative but to pay up or face the 
cessation of essential services to vulnerable island 
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communities. History suggests that when the market is 
faced with such opportunities, the market will exploit them. 
 
There are other lessons from history as I noted in Fraser 
Commentary Feb 08 with respect to NorthLink. This 
company informed the Scottish Executive that it could no 
longer realistically deliver its contractual obligations to the 
Northern Isles over the four years remaining of the contract 
for ferry services. The Scottish Executive concluded 
Northlink was heading for insolvency and unless additional 
subsidy was paid, lifeline services could have been 
interrupted.  Significant additional subsidy of about £43mill 
was then paid.  
 
There is no suggestion that Northlink was behaving 
strategically and that its difficulties were anything other than 
real and not contrived. The important point was that the 
government had no alternative to pay up because of the 
situation that was of the government’s creation. These 
failures may not be limited to the Northlink contract in the 
future, yet these risks have been created and deemed 
acceptable by policy makers in the face of all that is 
accepted as good (and indeed necessary) practice in such 
contexts.   
 
5.  Gourock-Dunoon  
On 31 December, the Scottish Government issued a tender 
notice for the Gourock-Dunoon public service8. Presently 
the public service there runs a mixed vehicle and foot 
passenger service, vehicle-carrying in unsubsidized 
competition with Western Ferries, a commercial operator. 
The present subsidy for the public service is for the carriage 
of foot passengers only.  Although the new contract is for a 
subsidized service on a route classifiable as a public service 
route under EC guidelines, there is no maximum fare or 
minimum fare specified in the contract notice as would is 
permissible with PSOs, and operators are expected to 
supply their own vessels, unlike other CalMac routes where 
the government builds and supplies the vessels. Thus 
obviously precludes bidders opting to build their own 
vessels since the contracts will only be for six years, which 
means that they will have to find whatever is available on 
the second hand market.  This by definition is composed of 
vessels not explicitly designed for that route, and biased 
towards the obsolete and inefficient.   
 
The official report into the Gourock-Dunoon ferry market 9 
conducted by Deloitte Touche for the Scottish Executive 
confirmed that the most efficient and least subsidy method 
to provide for the subsidized foot passenger market was 
with combined vehicle and passenger vessels to help to 
offset the subsidy needed for the low revenue / high cost 
foot passenger market. However these vessels usually have 
to be designed and built specially, as is demonstrated in 
other CalMac routes in Scottish waters, so it is highly 
unlikely that the two modern vehicle-passenger vessels that 
the Delloite Touche report identified as needed for this route 
will be secured by any potential bidder for this tender. 
 
The importance of Gourock-Dunoon can be seen from the 
map (Figure 1). The Gourock-Dunoon ferries cover a short 
distance, for much the same reason (and serving much the 
same function) that the Forth Bridges provide over on the 
East Coast of Scotland, in transport terms and 
geographically these ferries are the mirror image of the 
Forth Bridges. The Gourock-Dunoon ferries are an essential 
and intrinsic part of the West Coast transport network with 
the road alternative involving an 84 mile detour.  
 
There is no guarantee as to what, if any, bids will be 
received for this new tender. The last tender for the service 
led to no bids at all and CalMac continuing with the public 
service by default, leading to accusations of the government 
having failed to abide by EC law.    
 
Given what appears to be (at best) a very thin second hand 
market for suitable vehicle-passenger ferries, it is entirely 
possible that the public service route will become 
passenger-only, giving the private firm Western Ferries the 
status of sole operator of vehicle carrying traffic Gourock-
Dunoon.  This in turn raises a range of problems and issues 
which policy-makers have created, some of which are 
covered in the next section.   
     
6.  Reconciling private interests and public 
interests  
Normally the question of reconciling private commercial 
interests with the public interest when dealing with an 
industry providing an essential service is the job of an 
industry regulator in the context of a dedicated statutory 
framework with back up from a pre-specified Operator of 
Last Resort.  However, as we have noted, there are no such 
provisions in Scottish ferry policy.  
 
To consider some of the issues that this has raised, we shall 
consider possible indicative developments involving just one 
private company, Western Ferries and some of its publicly 
stated interests in other ferry routes. 
 
First, Western Ferries have already stated that they are 
bidding for the Gourock-Dunoon public service, and as we 
have noted in the previous section even if they are 
unsuccessful this could still lead to the private firm being the 
sole operator of vehicle-carrying ferries Gourock-Dunoon.10 
 
Second, Western Ferries have also recently announced 
their intention to mount a commercial challenge to CalMac’s 
Addrossan-Brodick public service11, and in the opinion of 
Professor Alf Baird of Napier’s Transport Research Institute, 
competition between the two operators would be unlikely to 
be sustainable in the long run12, raising the possibility that 
the private operator could crowd out the vehicle-carrying 
public service operator on this route also.    
   
Third, Western Ferries have a long-standing and publicly 
stated interest in running a service from Bute to Ardyne 
Point on the Cowal Peninsula13, once the public road and 
associated infrastructure have been upgraded by the local 
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council. This route lies between both the Colintraive-
Rhubodach and Rothesay-Wemyss Bay CalMac ferry routes 
from Bute (see figure 1), with Ardyne Point lying on the 
same peninsula as Colintraive. For most travelers, the route 
at Ardyne would be a direct substitute for the Colintraive 
ferry, which could well see a crowding out of that public 
service for much the same reason that the CalMac Arran 
service could be crowded out by Western Ferries.  
 
However, the Ardyne service when combined with Western 
Ferries Gourock-Dunoon service using the Cowal Peninsula 
as a land bridge could also prove an alternative to the 
Wemyss Bay / Rothesay service for many travelers from 
Bute to Inverclyde and Glasgow (less so for travellers from 
Bute to Ayrshire direction) . Since Western Ferries service 
would be a commercial service, this could lead to a 
repetition of complaints that Western have made in the case 
of Gourock-Dunoon that their commercial vehicle-carrying 
service was facing unfair competition from the subsidised 
CalMac service. That again could be seen as legitimising for 
Bute a repetition of what happened on Gourock-Dunoon 
where the public vehicle-carrying service was first restricted, 
and may now be terminated, as a consequence of 
measures taken by the government to insulate the Western 
Ferries service from competition from the public service.   
 
I would emphasise I am not commenting on the likelihood of 
any or all of this happening, this is just reporting Western 
Ferries publicly declared interests and possible plans, and 
their possible implications. Nor should this be seen as 
voicing any opinion on the economic costs and benefits of 
actual route options such as short crossings. And there are 
also other scenarios such as the possible extension of the 
government’s pilot RET (Road Equivalent Tariff) scheme 
into the Clyde routes that would affect these possibilities.  
However even the most likely and most immediate  scenario 
in which Western absorbed all of CalMac’s Gourock-Dunoon 
vehicular traffic would lead to an outcome in which the 
private operator on this one route would be carrying about 
two-thirds the volume of cars carried by what was left of the 
CalMac network.14
   
 
The fundamental point of concern, of which Western’s plans 
are indicative, is the potential nature and scale of scenarios 
associated with such plans and possible outcomes. The four 
public service routes discussed here shown in Figure 1 
(Arran, the two Bute routes, and Gourock-Dunoon) carried 
451,000 cars in 2008, the rest of the CalMac network 
carried 662,000 cars in the same year, while Western 
Ferries carried 588,000 cars.15 
 
An extreme scenario in which competition from Western 
Ferries leads to the company absorbing all the traffic from 
these four CalMac  routes would on the 2008 figures lead to 
Western Ferries  carrying 50% more car traffic than would  
left for the rump of the CalMac network.  In such a scenario 
a commercial firm would be sole operator for several routes 
classifiable under UK and EC rules as public service routes 
and so eligible for the imposition of PSOs such as maximum 
prices and minimum frequency.  But since this government 
and its predecessor have chosen not to make use of the 
tools that UK and EC law has given it, and set up a proper 
regulatory framework, it is questionable whether such 
measures would be implemented.  
 
In such circumstances, there is no suggestion here that 
Western Ferries and other potential commercial entrants 
would be doing anything other than pursuing legitimate 
shareholder interests under the existing law.  But as we 
teach in Economics 101, private interest is not always fully 
reconcilable with the public interest, especially where the 
provision of essential services by private local monopolies is 
concerned. The failures of successive administration to 
recognize and deal with that simple point are likely to be felt 
by vulnerable and fragile communities for generations to 
come.      
  
Conclusion 
The Commission Decision on alleged State aid to Scottish 
ferries has done nothing to mend structural fault lines 
running through policy-making in relation to public services 
provided on the Scottish ferry network. The Commission 
cannot be blamed for these failures which are not their 
responsibility, but the lack of willingness on the part of 
successive administrations to deal with these failures raises 
serious risks to the public interest, most especially for the 
taxpayer, the users, and the communities who depend on 
these essential services.   
 
 
Addendum 
The present Scottish Administration has been carrying out a 
“Ferries Review” of policy in this area, the Review was 
originally ordered under the previous Labour/LibDem 
administration. As this Commentary was going to press, the 
Herald newspaper reported that a government memo made 
available to the newspaper indicated that the date of 
publication for the Review was “in reality” likely to be later 
than the latest date for the next Scottish parliamentary 
election due May 5, 2011 (CalMac review advises break-
up, Herald, 7th February 2010). In short, the present 
administration will simply have started a Review ordered by 
its predecessor, and then passed on to its successor any 
decisions about publication, and any decision or decisions 
as to what, if anything, should be done about the Review. If 
any further evidence were needed of the ostrich-like 
behaviour I describe in my article, this timely example would 
be difficult to surpass.  
 
____________________ 
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Sustainable Glasgow     
 
 
 
 Richard Bellingham 
Senior Research Fellow, University of Strathclyde and 
Programme Director for Sustainable Glasgow 
 
 
The Sustainable Glasgow Initiative aims to help Glasgow 
become one of Europe’s most sustainable cities.  For 
Glasgow sustainability means achieving a mix of objectives 
– reducing carbon – but also achieving urban regeneration; 
delivering jobs and training; helping change the city’s image; 
regenerating communities, and tackling fuel poverty. 
 
The initiative has been led by the University of Strathclyde in 
an innovative partnership between academia, the city 
council, major energy companies, the regional development 
agency, and investment interests.   
 
This paper summarises the key findings and 
recommendations of the Sustainable Glasgow report – and 
examines the way forward for the initiative. 
 
The initiative started in Autumn 2008 and over the last year 
has conducted a set of major feasibility studies into 
understanding Glasgow’s carbon emissions, and identifying 
the technically and financially viable opportunities that would 
feasibly reduce the city’s carbon emissions by 30% within 
10 years1.  The full report was published on 27 January and 
is available at www.sustainableglasgow.org.uk.   
 
The policy context 
Ambitious targets are being set to reduce carbon emissions 
at EU, UK and Scottish levels.  EU targets require the UK to 
obtain 15% of all its energy (covering heat, transport and 
electricity) from renewable sources by 2020.  Both UK and 
Scottish governments have set targets to achieve an 80% 
reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 – and the Scottish 
Government’s interim target may require a 42% reduction in 
emissions by 2020.  These targets sit within a wider policy 
context – with governments also aiming to achieve 
economic growth, and social policy objectives – such as the 
Scottish government’s aim to eradicate fuel poverty by 
2016. 
 
There is an inherent tension in reducing carbon emissions 
whilst simultaneously seeking economic and population 
growth, and tackling fuel poverty.  Economic growth tends to 
increase carbon emissions, and the UK regulatory system 
for supporting the growth of renewable energy directly leads 
to increases in the price of energy charged to consumers.  
Achieving these targets means delivering more economic 
output and more useful work (eg more buildings heated) 
from each unit of energy consumed – as well as radically 
increasing the amount of low carbon energy delivered (and 
that must include heat – not just electricity).  Glasgow is not 
alone in this.  This is a worldwide issue. 
 
Cities have a vital role to play in delivering a low carbon 
future – by their nature they are major concentrations of 
people and resources.  UN figures suggest that cities 
currently contain over half the world’s population – and are 
responsible for the consumption of 75% of the world’s 
energy, and 80% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.  
Projections suggest that the share of the world’s population 
living in cities will grow significantly over the next 20 years – 
particularly in the developing world.  In developed countries 
most of the cities and most of the buildings that will exist in 
2050 are already in place. Retro-fitting low carbon 
technologies and approaches, and integrating these with the 
existing infrastructure in cities, and with ongoing city 
development, is therefore one of the major issues facing 
governments in reducing carbon emissions. 
 
The way we live and work in cities, and the systems that 
enable cities to operate, must therefore change dramatically 
if we are to achieve significant carbon emission reductions. 
 
The municipal level creates real opportunities for achieving 
decarbonised societies and economies.  Cities have the 
necessary scale to make projects viable, to attract 
investment and possess the political focus and powers that 
can applied to assist the implementation of a coherent 
strategic approach. 
 
The vision and the partnership 
The Sustainable Glasgow Initiative is a consortium led by 
the University of Strathclyde, with Glasgow City Council, 
Scottish and Southern Energy, Scottish Power, Source One 
Veolia, and Scottish Enterprise.   
 
Glasgow faces a range of issues – including a need to 
increase levels of economic activity and to regenerate 
communities, as well as major opportunities such as the 
Commonwealth Games in 2014 (which will attract a 
worldwide audience of over 1 billion people).  Sustainability 
in Glasgow must take account of all these factors – not just 
aim to meet environmental targets.   
 
The vision of the partnership is to make Glasgow one of 
Europe’s most sustainable cities within 10 years - and to do 
this in a way that will improve the lifestyles and opportunities 
for Glasgow’s people and businesses.  For Glasgow 
sustainability must be delivered in a way that is consistent 
with the development of a vibrant and growing city, 
delivering tangible economic and social benefits, and 
changing the image of the city. 
 
By successfully developing a shared vision of the city’s low 
carbon future Sustainable Glasgow has succeeded in 
bringing a number of significantly different interests together 
around a single agenda.  This was achieved by deliberately 
constructing the initiative’s objectives and vision so that it 
takes account of the objectives and agendas of different 
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public and private organisations – and setting a timescale 
(10 years) for the delivery of that vision that is both 
ambitious, achievable., and builds momentum.  For the 
private sector a 10 year timescale shows a long term 
commitment which is attractive in terms of its scale, and as 
a demonstration of public sector commitment to policy 
change that will act to reduce investment risk. The 10 year 
timescale also means that initiative is very clearly focussed 
on approaches that are technically and financially 
deliverable now – rather than on solutions that may become 
viable at some indefinite point in the future.  This clear focus 
on delivering real projects has made the initiative credible in 
the eyes of investors. 
 
By building the initiative to the point of “critical mass”; 
engaging in dialogue with key stakeholders; and delivering a 
convincing vision and strategy for Glasgow’s low carbon 
future, the initiative’s size, momentum, success and 
reputation has started to attract other partners – from both 
within the city and internationally.   
 
As well as major commercial entities the partners and 
stakeholders now being drawn into the initiative include 
Glasgow Housing Association (Europe’s largest landlord), 
the National Health Service, and the Clyde Gateway 
programme. These are all major investors in the city – as 
well as having important social dimensions to their 
objectives.  This strong social dimension to the Sustainable 
Glasgow partnership may prove to be a unique differentiator 
in relation to other sustainable city initiatives.  
 
A new holistic approach 
At around 4 million tonnes per annum Glasgow is 
responsible for around 8% of Scotland’s energy related 
carbon emissions.  Glasgow can therefore play a significant 
role in meeting Scotland’s carbon emission reduction 
targets.   
 
Emissions relating to domestic electricity are higher than 
would normally be expected – due to a high proportion of 
electrical heating – particularly in social housing.  
Commercial and industrial emissions make up a higher 
proportion reflecting economic activity in the centre of 
Glasgow.  Transport emissions are lower as rates of car 
ownership in Glasgow are the lowest in Scotland (at 0.25 
vehicles per head of population), and the second lowest in 
the UK – but vehicle ownership rates are increasing quickly 
and this will act to increase transport energy consumption, 
as well as having an adverse impact on air quality.  Unless 
action is taken Glasgow’s carbon emissions can be 
expected to increase over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The university team used new techniques that allowed the 
city’s carbon emissions and low carbon energy opportunities 
to be mapped in new ways – allowing the city to be 
understood holistically, and the spatial relationships 
between developments, infrastructure, carbon emissions, 
and low carbon energy resources to be used to identify new 
opportunities to reduce carbon emissions.  This is a radical 
departure from the conventional approach deployed by 
planners and utility companies in the UK – which normally 
considers each development separately, and does not seek 
to overcome the barriers that often exist between different 
organisations. A piecemeal approach fails to identify 
opportunities to link developments together in ways that 
make new low carbon energy systems viable.  
 
The map below shows that the city centre of Glasgow has 
the highest density of energy consumption in Scotland (once 
power stations and oil refineries are excluded) and this is 
mainly due to high levels of commercial and retail activity. 
Glasgow also has a number of significant industrial energy  
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Sustainable Glasgow main approaches to reducing carbon emissions 
 
 
Theme Example measures 
Reducing wasteful or unnecessary energy use by end 
users 
 
x Improved energy efficiency – eg household devices; 
vehicles; buildings 
x Behavioural Change 
x Energy management 
 
Improving the efficiency of energy systems 
 
x District Heating 
x Smart grids 
x Demand Management 
 
Reducing use of high carbon fuels x Phasing out of coal, oil and electrical resistance 
heating 
 
Exploiting local renewable energy resources 
 
x Biomass, solar, wind 
 
Reusing the city’s waste for low carbon energy 
  
x Capturing waste heat from industry 
x Waste to energy 
x Production of biogas from sewage and organic 
waste 
 
 
 
consumers – such as food and drink companies.  This 
geographic analysis allows Glasgow’s sustainability strategy 
to be designed so that it targets low carbon energy 
measures in the areas where they will have the most impact 
on Glasgow’s carbon emissions. 
 
This geographic analysis has allowed Glasgow’s 
sustainability strategy to be designed so that it targets low 
carbon energy measures in the areas where they will have 
the most impact on Glasgow’s carbon emissions. 
 
A new energy framework for the city 
Sustainable Glasgow proposes reducing the city’s carbon 
emissions through improved energy management and the 
development of new integrated low carbon energy systems 
for the city. 
 
By looking at the city in a new way Sustainable Glasgow 
takes a holistic view of the city and its opportunities – and 
proposed energy systems are designed so that they support 
each other, as part of a wider framework, rather than as a 
series of opportunistic small-scale changes to existing 
systems.  The main opportunities for the city lie in the 
development of district heating networks; harnessing of 
waste for energy; biomass energy systems; sustainable 
transport; energy management; and smart grids.  By 
allowing these different technologies to support each other 
carbon reductions are maximised and commercial risks 
reduced.   
 
Delivering city-wide large scale carbon emission reductions 
requires major change – and this change will need to be 
delivered by large scale projects and large scale investment 
that will create a new integrated clean energy infrastructure 
for the city. Significant changes to create a supportive public 
policy environment are also necessary. Small scale and 
emerging renewable technologies also have the potential to 
make a contribution to carbon emission reductions as well 
as generating community engagement and direct benefit. 
 
The main themes for reducing the city’s carbon emissions 
related to its energy use are summarised in the table below.  
The list below is not a hierarchy, all of these opportunities 
need to be pursued in an integrated fashion in order to 
maximise carbon emission reductions. No one technology or 
approach can deliver the levels of carbon emission 
reduction required. 
 
The systems proposed are in use individually elsewhere in 
the world already – so their technical feasibility is proven. 
What is unique is the way these systems have been 
integrated and designed for sympathetic retro-fitting on a 
large scale into an existing city. The proposed new systems 
are shown in the diagram below. It shows how the city will 
harness cleaner energy sources and use more efficient 
systems to deliver carbon emission reductions. 
 
• New low carbon energy systems will process the 
city’s sewage and municipal waste using microbes 
(anaerobic digestion) to produce biogas which can 
fuel buses and generate heat and power for the 
city. 
 
• Compost and digestate produced from anaerobic 
digestion can make the city’s vacant land more 
fertile to help grow urban woodlands. 
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• Timber from the new urban woodlands and from 
forests around Glasgow will be used to generate 
heat and power for the city in biomass energy 
centres. 
• District heating systems will use underground 
insulated hot water pipes to take the heat from 
these low carbon energy sources to businesses 
and communities for heating buildings and 
providing hot water. 
• Highly efficient local energy centres will use natural 
gas and biogas in Combined Heat and Power 
systems to generate low carbon heat and 
electricity. 
• The above systems will also allow waste heat and 
other waste materials from industrial and 
commercial premises to be captured and used to 
provide low carbon energy for the city. 
• Wind and microgeneration technologies such as 
solar power will also make a contribution to 
providing low carbon energy. 
• Smart grids offer the opportunity to integrate low 
carbon technologies and manage energy demand 
through enhanced energy distribution and 
transmission in ways that offer greater carbon 
emission reductions. 
• New energy efficiency measures and energy 
management systems are implemented in homes, 
public buildings, and businesses to improve the 
efficiency of energy use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on a detailed analysis of the evidence the estimated 
contribution each approach would make within 10 years to 
Glasgow’s 30% carbon emissions reduction is given below: 
 
 
x Combined Heat and Power/District Heating 9% 
x Biomass     2% 
x Biogas and Waste to Energy systems 6% 
x Other renewable energy systems  3% 
x Sustainable Transport systems  3% 
x Phasing out high carbon fuels   3% 
x Energy management and energy efficiency 6% 
 
The opportunities already identified come to slightly more 
than the 30% target proposed. 
  
Implementation of these systems will require co-operation 
from a wide range of commercial and public sector entities – 
and there is already strong interest from investors, 
developers and utility companies in taking these projects 
forward. 
 
The map below shows how these opportunities relate to 
each other.  Detailed analysis has allowed projects to be 
located so that they target areas with the highest carbon 
emissions; capitalise on the city’s low carbon energy 
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resources; and integrate with major developments in the 
city. 
 
More than technology 
Sustainable Glasgow is not just about technology.  The 
effectiveness of the Sustainable Glasgow initiative in the 
medium and longer term will depend on achieving changes 
in behaviour and attitudes amongst Glasgow’s organisations 
and individuals – in homes, in communities, in businesses, 
and within the public sector. In some cases, this will involve 
the widespread adoption of sustainable systems (such as 
district heating and public transport) over alternatives; in 
others it will be the result of cumulative small-scale actions 
(eg waste reduction, energy efficiency, and community 
renewable energy projects). Understanding how to change 
Glasgow’s behaviour towards more pro-environmental 
actions is thus a critical part of the initiative. 
 
The creation of a supportive regime of public policy 
measures is a vital step in ensuring that Sustainable 
Glasgow is successfully delivered over the long term – 
maximising positive impacts for the city and minimising any 
negative impacts. The public policy regime will also ensure 
that Sustainable Glasgow makes a full contribution to 
delivering a wider range of policy objectives – such as 
tackling fuel poverty; delivering jobs; regenerating 
communities; and building a positive image for the city.   
 
For example, Sustainable Glasgow is proposing new 
measures aimed at creating a supportive planning regime 
for the development and adoption of strategic low carbon 
energy systems in Glasgow – as well as protecting the 
environment and the community, and ensuring compatibility 
with overall city development plans and objectives. Some of 
these proposals will also have wider impacts, such as the 
creation of additional costs for developers and businesses 
operating the city, though these measures will also deliver 
benefits. These proposals will therefore need careful 
consideration and consultation by Glasgow City Council 
should it wish to adopt them 
 
Business models and investment 
Implementing these opportunities will require investment of 
around £1.5 billion.  Most of these projects will generate 
significant revenues and offer good rates of return on capital 
investments.  Much of this investment is expected to come 
from the private sector – which even in a recession has 
remained strongly interested in energy investments that can 
deliver long term and predictable rates of return on capital.  
Changes in regulatory structures (such as the Feed In 
Tariffs and the Renewable Heat Incentive) are being 
introduced that provide additional subsidies for low carbon 
energy generation. In addition, by working with existing 
major investments in the city (such as the Southern General 
Hospital, the New Campus Project, and the Commonwealth 
Games village) the initiative is succeeding in levering in 
additional public investment, and should deliver tangible 
results more quickly.  Sustainable Glasgow is already 
having an impact in relation to these projects – with many 
projects showing an enthusiasm to take on board 
Sustainable Glasgow’s principles and strategic approach. 
 
Business models to finance renewable electricity projects 
are well understood – with an existing incentive system and 
grid infrastructure available for connection. Viable projects 
should therefore not struggle to raise finance. However in 
urban areas there may be additional merit in employing 
business models which include community involvement and 
or community benefit – as community based projects are 
likely to experience lower levels of public opposition. 
 
However community involvement needs to be considered in 
line with the need to meet financing requirements. The study 
recommends that communities are assisted to become 
involved in smaller scale projects – and that larger scale 
projects are required to deliver community benefits. 
 
More novel and larger scale infrastructure projects are likely 
to require different business models. For example, because 
there is no existing heat distribution system, the heat market 
is unregulated, the overall size of investment is large, and 
there is no existing market in heat that the proposed 
CHP/district heating system would benefit in particular from 
the creation of a public private partnership to raise capital, 
implement the infrastructure, regulate the system’s 
operation, and act as a “heat broker” between heat suppliers 
and customers. 
 
A further option for raising and holding the required capital 
would be the creation of a public private investment trust 
which could invest in a whole range of low carbon projects 
across the city –such as renewable electricity, waste to 
energy, biogas, urban forests, district heating, and transport 
projects.  This trust structure allows for projects to be 
combined for financial purposes allowing for investment 
diversity and decreasing potential investor risk – thus 
allowing more innovative projects to attract funding. 
 
Next steps 
The Sustainable Glasgow initiative is strongly focussed on 
achieving the delivery of real projects and tangible benefits 
for local people and businesses. 
 
Coordinating delivery of major new clean energy systems is 
not a trivial task – but Sustainable Glasgow is already 
changing the way that people and organisations think about 
and plan energy systems in the city. Ensuring that the 
opportunities identified are delivered in reality will require a 
focussed programme of further activity to bring in the right 
partners; draw in the necessary funding; resolve regulatory 
issues; and integrate Sustainable Glasgow proposals into 
city plans, policies and strategies. 
 
Maintaining momentum will require a continued co-ordinated 
push from the Council and its partners.  Projects around the 
world have shown that high level political buy in is vital to
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building the support of stakeholders and ensuring a lasting 
positive impact.   
 
New governance structures are currently being put in place.  
This includes a high level board which will include the heads 
of key stakeholder organisations in the city – and will 
therefore include the Leader of the city council and the 
Principal of the University of Strathclyde (for example).  A 
steering group supported by a number of sub-groups 
(composed of the relevant partners) will drive forward 
activity on finance, public policy, planning, and individual 
projects. 
 
Sustainable Glasgow has successfully identified major 
opportunities for reducing the city’s carbon emissions, 
growing the city’s green economy, tackling fuel poverty, and 
changing the city’s image.  These opportunities need further 
analysis of costs, risks, impacts, future developments and 
integration with the city plan, to allow production of an 
overall energy master plan for Sustainable Glasgow that 
takes account of how the city will change over coming 
years. 
 
Finally, Government targets make clear that even greater 
carbon emissions reductions will be required in the future.  
These systems have been designed so that they have the 
inherent flexibility to be expanded and to integrate a wider 
range of low carbon technologies – thus increasing 
Glasgow’s ability to contribute to Scotland and the UK 
meeting tighter carbon targets in the future. Sustainable 
Glasgow’s strategy will require ongoing monitoring and 
revision in response to progress achieved; as new 
opportunities become available, the regulatory environment 
changes, and changing external factors. 
 
Sustainable Glasgow is not a one-off exercise, it is an 
ongoing process summarised by the diagram below. 
 
Summary 
Many cities across the world have ambitions to become 
more sustainable. However such initiatives often perform 
poorly in practice due to having vague and unrealistic 
objectives; a poor evidence base; no realistic 
implementation plan; a scattergun interest in new 
technologies; an undue focus on small scale pilot projects 
with no plan for further roll-out; a sole focus on the public 
sector; lack of continuity in leadership, and no clear 
business and financing model.  
 
Sustainable Glasgow’s approach is to develop a clear 
realistic strategic framework that applies a strong evidence 
base to identify the main investment and carbon reduction 
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opportunities in the city; to integrate these so that projects 
and technologies support each other; to deliver these in a 
way that is both technically and financially achievable, to 
build powerful partnerships, and integrate these proposals 
with supportive public policy structures and financial 
mechanisms.  Glasgow may present a viable model that 
other cities can learn from and adopt. 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes 
1This meets the Scottish Government’s target of achieving a 42% 
reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 as this target is baselined 
against 1990 emission levels. 
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